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Abstract
Elderly households hold most of their wealth in housing, maintain high levels
of wealth throughout retirement, and often leave bequests. The value of their
houses are subject to large shocks. To what extent do these shocks affect their
savings, consumption, and bequests? Answering this question requires separating precautionary savings, bequest motives, and the desire to remain in one’s
home. I develop and estimate a structural model of retirement savings decisions
with realistic risks, housing, and heterogeneity in bequest preferences. I exploit
policy changes to the taxation of housing and bequests to separately identify
the different motives for holding wealth. Estimates show approximately half of
retirees have no bequest motive. House price changes are quantitatively important, with 1/4 of increases passed on to future generations. I use the estimated
model to evaluate means-tested programs insuring retirees’ LTC expenses. I
find exemptions providing marginal liquidity have larger insurance value than
fully eliminating LTC expense risk per pound it costs the government.
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Introduction

In the last quarter century, the OECD’s over 65 population has grown by more than
40% and is projected to increase further. These older households hold lots of wealth,
even at advanced ages, and often leave bequests. Most of this wealth is in the form
of houses, which exposes elderly households, with relatively short planning horizons,
to significant house price risk. Furthermore, houses provide a consumption flow,
are illiquid, and are often exempt from tests on assets that determine eligibility for
important government insurance programs.
This paper aims to understand the connections between household portfolios,
savings, and expenditure decisions in old age, taking into account the role of bequests
and long term care (LTC) risks. I use the response of household consumption and
savings to house price shocks and liquid wealth shocks to understand the different
role played by these assets. I use evidence from a natural experiment affecting the
returns to liquidating housing to inform a rich structural model of household decisions.
With the model I evaluate the welfare implications of governmental LTC insurance
programs, which frequently include exemptions for housing wealth.
To uncover the importance of retiree responses to changing financial incentives
to liquidate housing, I examine behaviour around thresholds in the tax system. In
particular, I exploit discontinuous increases in the Average Tax Rate (ATR) levied
on housing transactions in the UK using data from the English Longitudinal Study of
Aging. I examine how retirees adjust the housing component of their portfolio when
the financial incentives differ on either side of this discontinuity. I argue small changes
in the ATR generate large implicit taxes on extracting home equity by downsizing.
Next, I show that in response to a £5,000 increase in the tax burden on their property
retirees halve their probability of selling in the next two years - an almost 3 percentage
point reduction. Additional analysis of moving decisions shows a minority of retirees
move to renting and a majority remain homeowners after selling their current house.
These empirical results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that housing equity is
trapped or held passively in retirement. Instead, all else equal, retirees are more likely
to downsize as prices rise and cash out housing windfalls.
As houses are complex assets affecting incentives through multiple channels, I
explore this mechanism further using a dynamic structural model in which retirees
choose between investing in housing, risk-free liquid wealth, or consuming today. To
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correctly determine households’ desire for liquidity, consumption, and savings for bequests over different horizons, and consequently their demand for different assets I
incorporate a rich set of risks, including aggregate risks, and preference heterogeneity between households. Separately identifying precautionary savings motives, the
desire to remain in one’s home, and a bequest motive when there are many reasons
households may hold wealth presents a considerable empirical challenge even when
preferences are homogenous.1 To identify preferences for housing and its illiquidity
separately from other savings motives, I exploit longitudinal variation in both housing
transaction and estate taxes as well as UK house prices. I match moments on wealth
composition, moving house and a measure of subjective expectations across multiple
policy regimes using the method of simulated moments.
I validate the estimated model by estimating the response to discontinuous increases in the transaction tax ATR in simulated data - moments intentionally excluded in estimation. The model matches the magnitude of retirees’ responses to
changes in the financial incentive for moving house and other key facts on the evolution of household portfolios included as targets. Estimated parameters reveal retirees
value the independence associated with remaining a homeowner and they incur considerable costs when moving house. In addition, there is important dispersion in the
desire to leave a bequest which is correlated with saving before retirement.
Armed with the carefully estimated model matching these and other important
facts, I quantify responses to changes in different sources of retirement wealth. UK
house prices more than doubled in the last 30 years. To what extent are these windfalls
shared with younger generations? On average, only a quarter of house price shocks
experienced at age 70 are passed on to future generations as bequests. In contrast,
40% of liquid wealth shocks are passed on. The key mechanism driving this disparity
is the opposite effects on liquidity constraint from increasing in house prices and liquid
wealth. For retirees with little liquid wealth, house price increases make downsizing
more attractive as they have more cash to spend after the sale. Injecting the same of
money into their bank account lowers the probability of downsizing because they have
more resources to spend today without needing to sell their house. This generates
large differences in aggregate downsizing behaviour and realized bequests.
I use the estimated model to examine the design of means-testing LTC benefits for
retirees’ well-being. The UK government is payer of last resort for LTC expenditures,
1

See, for instance, De Nardi et al. (2010); Ameriks et al. (2020); Lockwood (2018).
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requiring retirees first spend down their private resources.2 In practice, differences
in how resources are assigned across spouses exempts the housing wealth of couples
from this requirement. Taking the current eligibility rules as given, I simulate retirees
through a set of counterfactual reforms eliminating differences across asset classes. For
each pound the government spends, I find providing exemptions on just liquid wealth
deliver 75% of the benefits from exempting combined housing and liquid wealth.
Crucially, exempting only housing wealth does not provide enough liquidity to keep
healthy spouses in their homes. When retirees place a high value on their illiquid
housing, the value of providing marginal liquidity through exemptions is high.
Related Literature This paper makes three contributions. First, I develop and
estimate a dynamic life cycle model including precautionary saving, heterogeneous
bequest motives and a rich model of housing choice. To estimate different savings
motives in retirement, I combine self-reported probabilities of leaving an inheritance
(a widely available survey instrument) with data on portfolios and quasi-experimental
variation in tax schedules. This compliments the instrumental variable approach proposed by Lee and Tan (2019). Ameriks et al. (2020) instead combine panel data on
financial wealth with hypothetical choice experiments from bespoke strategic survey
questions on bequests and long term care. Inkmann and Michaelides (2012), De Nardi
et al. (2016a), and Lockwood (2018) estimate quantitatively important bequest motives to rationalize insurance under-utilization (life insurance, Medicaid take-up and
LTC insurance respectively). The allocation of wealth across assets with different
self-insurance capacities provides similar information on precautionary motives and
provides a potential alternative explanation for this underutilization.3
Second, I document the importance of housing wealth and downsizing decisions in
retirement. This is closely related to studies of housing demand at younger ages, for
instance Cocco (2005) and Attanasio et al. (2012), and portfolio choice in retirement,
including Yogo (2016). Nakajima and Telyukova (2020) and Cocco and Lopes (2020)
2

As with Medicaid coverage in the US, eligibility is determined by both income and wealth. This
imposes a 100% marginal tax on both savings and income above eligibility thresholds.
3
Several studies explore the role of idiosyncratic risk in old age with Hurd (1989) suggesting
mortality risk is the primary empirical driver of savings in retirement or, as in Palumbo (1999),
medical expenses faced by retired households are necessary to explain their limited deaccumulation.
Studies in this tradition argue risk averse households maintain wealth and exhibit slow deaccumulation because of high levels of precautionary savings and that bequests are accidental. De Nardi
et al. (2010) find longevity and medical expenditure risk dominate for singles, while De Nardi et al.
(2021) find bequest motives are important for couples. De Nardi et al. (2016b) survey this literature.
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have the closest asset structure to the model in this paper among studies of retirees.
Both model retirees’ decisions to remain in their own home and how this dampens
the use of reverse mortgage loans. I focus on the intensive and extensive margin of
downsizing as a means of home equity extraction, presenting novel causal evidence
on its response to financial incentives embedded in the tax system. I calculate the
welfare effects of, hitherto little studied, differential means-testing across asset classes.
In contemporaneous work, Achou (2020) studies the welfare effects of Medicaid’s
homestead exemption on single US retirees focusing on medical spending and the
homeownership decision. I study a similar policy for married UK retirees as well as
exemptions on their liquid wealth. I show how these policies affect marginal liquidity
and welfare. Additionally, couples who are a large share of the elderly, are more likely
to own houses and hold more wealth at all ages.
Third, this study illustrates the implications of rising house prices for the savings and consumption behaviour of retirees. Rising house prices may lead to larger
bequests if retirees retain housing wealth. Alternatively, they may offset increases
by spending part of their windfall. This paper investigates how different windfalls
affect consumption expenditures in retirement and the intergenerational transmission
of wealth. Early attempts to understand the effect of house price changes on the
consumption and savings decisions of retirees include Skinner (1996). His work emphasises how economizing on housing services by downsizing may offer an alternative
way to self-insure, but that large fractions of housing wealth may be bequeathed.
This work builds on similar insights by adding theoretical structure using a life cycle
framework and detailed micro data on wealth, health, and choices from a panel of
retirees. I quantify the housing wealth effect4 on both consumption and bequests
comparing it with the effect of pension windfalls. Lockwood (2018) argues bequests
are more subject to substitution than own consumption. Consequently, retirees cut
back the relative luxury of bequests when they need resources, rather than cut consumption (Browning and Crossley, 2000). The fungibility of savings for bequests
lowers the opportunity cost of self-insurance and demand for formal insurance. Here
I focus on how this greater substitution affects consumption out of housing wealth.
Incorporating heterogeneous bequest motives allows me to document important
4

An increase in household expenditures in response to an increase in home values. An inexhaustive
list of recent contributions focusing on those using micro data include Mian et al. (2013); Kaplan
et al. (2020); Aladangady (2017); Berger et al. (2018); Guren et al. (2021).
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variation in responses to windfalls. Hurd (1989) models binary heterogeneity by assuming no bequest motive for the childless. My approach is closer to the finite-mixture
estimation in Kopczuk and Lupton (2007), relying on a classification procedure to
reduce the dimensionality and retain tractability. I allow for more flexibility in parameterizing bequest motives and distinguish preference heterogeneity from differences in
portfolios. Ameriks et al. (2018) allow for idiosyncratic bequest motives estimated using strategic survey questions, but focus only on the financial component of household
portfolios. Understanding windfall responses is an important step in understanding
housing’s role in financing retirement and the adequacy of individual’s nest eggs for
retirement. Both Scholz et al. (2006) and Gomes et al. (2020) study this question
under different assumptions about the draw down of housing in retirement.

2

Data & Key Facts

The English Longitudinal Study of aging (ELSA) began in 2002/03, it is a biennial
survey modeled on the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) containing a representative sample of the non-institutionalized English population aged 50+. It collects
detailed panel data on demographics, earnings, health, wealth and portfolios using
face to face interviews and supplementary questionnaires.
I use data from the first 7 waves and present statistics for within group means for
each five year birth cohort and, as discussed below, stratified by additional data.. To
abstract from labour decisions around retirement, I keep a subsample of households
where the head is above the age of 65 (the state pension age for men) and who do
not participate in the labour market.5 Consistent with the model, I drop households
when either a new individual enters or leaves the household before death - this drops
all households who either divorce or remarry during the sample period, but includes
the newly widowed. I top-code wealth moments at the within group 95th percentile
and drop cells with fewer than 15 observations to mitigate the impact of outliers.
As a cohort ages, it is increasingly comprised of rich people due to mortality
differences between the rich and poor. To mitigate composition effects, I present
wealth trajectories grouped by Permanent Income (PI) quantiles.6 This controls for
5

I define non-participation as households with labour income below pension credit levels, a meanstested benefit which tops up household income for those out of work and eligible for state pensions.
6
Attanasio and Emmerson (2003) document this composition bias in the UK. Results using a
balanced panel for those surviving from the first wave until the final wave are similar, but impose
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the lifetime income levels of the households. To calculate PI I follow the approach in
De Nardi et al. (2021) and exploit the approximately monotonic relationship between
lifetime resources and pension income in the UK. I sum all sources of annuity income
in retirement and regress this measure on a polynomial in age interacted with family
composition and a fixed effect. I take the percentile rank of the fixed effect as an
estimate of each household’s PI - a measure invariant to household demographics.
Appendix A provides more details. For clarity, I present results for three birth cohorts
in the main text: those born between 1915 and 1919, 1925 and 1929, and 1935 and
1939. Results for remaining cohorts are shown in Appendix B.
I generate three PI groups: the top 25% of households, the second quartile, and
the bottom 50% of households. I separate households by PI, cohort, and by their
initial homeownership status to additionally control for housing tenure. I define initial
homeownership in the first wave a household enters the sample and this definition
keeps the composition of each group constant in the analysis. Although there are
differences in initial homeownership rates, I group the bottom two PI quartiles as
conditional wealth holdings are extremely similar. For renters, I do not stratify by
PI as they are largely drawn from the bottom 50% of the PI distribution.
To explore savings in different forms of wealth I present results for housing and
non-housing wealth. Housing wealth is the value of their primary residence. Mortgage
debt and other property is included in liquid wealth - for retirees these balances are
small. Liquid (or non-housing) wealth also includes savings and current accounts,
bonds/gilts, premium bonds, shares, trusts, and other physical assets less credit card
debt, private debt and any other outstanding loans or debts.7

2.1

Housing Wealth

Savings in retirement differ by PI and a large share of this heterogeneity is driven
by differences in housing wealth. The left panel of Figure 1 shows the mean housing
wealth of households and the right panel shows the frequency with which initial
homeowners move properties over a two year period (the frequency of the ELSA
data). There is a strong PI gradient for housing wealth even after conditioning on
initial home ownership status. Focussing on the 1925-1929 birth cohort (dashed lines),
much stricter selection requirements while ignoring the important role of mortality risk at older ages.
7
Savings accounts include TESSA, all forms of ISA, PEPs, National Savings Accounts and life
insurance savings. I drop retirees who directly own businesses.
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Figure 1: Saving in Housing Wealth by Cohort (Initial Owners, ELSA data)
Panel (a): Each line shows a cohort-PI cell over the period 2002-14, plotted against average cohort
ages. Thicker lines denote higher PI groups. Panel (b): cohort cells for the same period.

owners in the top quartile hold on average £275,000 in housing wealth at age 77. Those
in the second quartile hold only £200,000 and those initial owners in the bottom half
of the PI distribution have an average of £165,000 in housing wealth at age 77. Both
absolute and relative differences increase with PI. While these differences vary across
cohorts and as cohorts age there remain large differences between PI groups.
One striking feature of the UK data is the presence of time effects, which have
been little studied in the context of the US or other countries.8 For all cohorts and PI
groups, housing wealth displays evidence of an aggregate trend. The x-axis plots the
average age within birth cohort - thus, within cohort aging is equivalent to plotting
a time dimension. Figure 2 plots the evolution of house prices over the previous
30 years. While broadly increasing, there is a clear correlation between their trend
and the housing wealth of retirees. In Figure 1a mean housing wealth increases by
£75,000 between ages 77 and 81 for retirees in the second PI quartile and the 1925-29
birth cohort. Between 81 and 83 these same households see almost 40% of this gain
reversed and gradual declines through the rest of the sample as house prices fall in
the wake of the great recession. Similar patterns are clear at different PI levels and
ages, but at the same points in calendar time.
The rise and subsequent fall in housing wealth differs across PI and birth cohort
8

As noted in Schulhofer-Wohl (2018) many studies attempt to cleanse time effects from estimation
moments in the data. As housing wealth is almost 70% of retirees’ aggregate wealth, total wealth
displays similar time effects inheriting this trend over the sample (see Appendix B).
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Figure 2: Relative House Prices
Quarterly real house prices over time, relative to 1990 Quarter 1. The red line plots data for the UK
and the green dashed line plots data for the US. The dashed blue line plots within quarter averages
for OECD member countries. Source: OECD Housing Prices Indicator (2021)

in part due to differences in moving house or cashing out behaviour. However, in the
aggregate, evidence of deaccumulation is limited. Average housing wealth increases
between the start and the end of the sample for all cohort and PI combinations as
prices appreciate, masking downsizing behaviour.
To understand the economic importance of household mobility and to distinguish
passive saving from active portfolio rebalancing of older households, I focus on the
frequency and size of decisions to adjust housing wealth. Figure 1b shows limited age
and cohort variation with an average of 4.4% of households selling their house and
moving each wave. These adjustments are infrequent with those over 65 moving only
once on average. Nevertheless, almost 50% of households move by age 90.
Moving house is one of the largest financial decisions during retirement. Adjustments are large and households can realise gains from changes in house prices. Table
1 provides statistics on the mean level and relative change in housing wealth for three
different categories: all downsizers, those who downsize and remain owner occupiers,
and those who upsize. Within downsizers, who are over 75% of movers, I separate
out transitions to renting to control for changes in the extensive margin of ownership.
Conditional on downsizing, the average household releases 52% of the current value
of their house or over £135,000. This is not driven by only the extensive margin
as downsizers who remain owner occupiers release over £100,000 of equity. This is
9

Downsizers (All)
Downsizers Remaining Owners
Upsizers (All)

Change in
Housing Wealtha
-136
-104
55.4

Relative
Changeb
0.48
0.72
1.34

Proportion
of Movers (%)
76.8
50.9
23.2

Source: Author’s own calculation from ELSA using a sample of 430 movers. All
columns report means. a £1000s in 2014 prices, b Relative change is defined as the
ratio of the new price to the old price at time of sale.

Table 1: Average Housing Wealth Change by Move Type
approximately 40% of the average total wealth level or 30% of their previous housing
wealth. The majority of retirees climb only a few rungs back down the housing ladder,
remaining homeowners even at advanced ages. Upsizers are the smallest group, but
they make large adjustments - increasing their housing wealth by a third.
On aggregate retirees retain capital gains in housing and house price changes affect
different birth cohorts at different ages. However, those moving house make large adjustments to their portfolio and many retirees move during their retirement. Housing
is a store of wealth that may appreciate or decline in value, provides a consumption flow and is subject to potentially large adjustment costs. Explicitly modeling
these assets is important for understanding saving during retirement, demand for
self-insurance, and the extent to which price changes improve financial security.

2.2

Liquid Wealth

Figure 3 displays average liquid wealth for the same groupings of initial owners on
the left. While differences between the bottom half of the PI distribution and the
second quartile are of similar magnitude to the absolute gap in housing wealth they
are larger in relative terms. The gap between the liquid wealth of the top quartile and
the second PI quartile is slightly larger than in housing wealth at almost £100,000
for each age and cohort pair. This is because, on average, housing wealth is a smaller
proportion of the portfolio of richer households.
Unlike housing wealth, there is no strong evidence of cyclicality in liquid wealth.
Furthermore, within each cohort-PI group there is some evidence of deaccumulation.
For the youngest two cohorts, liquid wealth in the top PI quartile falls by over £45,000
10
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Figure 3: Mean Liquid Wealth by Cohort (ELSA data)
Panel (a): Each line shows a cohort-PI cell over the period 2002-2014, plotted against average cohort
ages. Thicker lines denote higher PI groups. Panel (b): cohort cells for the same period.

(from £189,000 at age 67 to £148,000 by 79 and £184,000 at age 77 to £137,000 by
89) and by over £20,000 (from £81,000 at age 67 to £55,000 and £70,000 at age 77
to £47,000) for the second PI quartile. For the lowest PI group, the youngest cohort
show modest accumulation between ages 67 and 79, but deaccumulation of a similar
magnitude to the second PI quartile for the 1925-29 birth cohort.9
Finally, I turn to the liquid wealth of initial renters. In retirement, initial renters
tend to belong to lower PI percentiles. Thus, I pool all renters together. On average,
initial renters hold less than half the liquid wealth of their counterparts in the bottom
PI homeowners. They are both cash and income poor. While their wealth varies between £5,000 to £20,000 for different age and cohort combinations it is approximately
stable. In contrast, the savings of US retirees transitioning from owning to renting
decline (Nakajima and Telyukova, 2020).
For owners, increasing housing wealth offsets modest deaccumulation of liquid
wealth. Blundell et al. (2016) document price-driven housing wealth increases in the
UK in contrast to US evidence from the HRS. While US evidence typically finds more
deaccumulation among elderly singles, Poterba et al. (2018) document a high degree
of persistence between early retirement wealth and wealth at death. In the US, medical costs, longevity risk, bequests, and homeownership are important for explaining
this departure from the life cycle hypothesis. The results above highlight saving in
9

While there are some increases at the oldest ages, these cells tend to have fewer observations
and are, thus, noisier measurements.
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different assets and the interaction with asset price movements is an important part
of retirees’ financial behaviour and, consequently, the ‘retirement savings puzzle’.

3

Variation in Tax Incentives

When households cross thresholds in tax schedules their incentives to save, spend, and
hold different assets can change substantially. To help identify the structural model
described in the next section, I exploit variation in tax policy over time in addition
to cross-sectional differences. Changes to estate taxation and residential property
transaction taxes provide a source of quasi-experimental variation. This varies the
returns to leaving a bequest, to holding different assets, and the cost of transforming
housing wealth into liquid wealth. Furthermore, large fluctuations in house prices
lead to ‘bracket creep’ when price appreciation pushes households into higher tax
brackets. This section summarizes important changes to the tax environment over
the sample. Appendix C contains a full list of reforms and discuses anticipation.
I then show how the moving decisions of older households responds to changes
in financial incentives. This exploits thresholds in the transaction tax schedule using
a regression discontinuity research design. The results highlights the quantitative
importance of the financial incentive and housing windfall mechanism. Furthermore,
it demonstrates why tax policy variation is a useful source of empirical identification.10

3.1

Inheritance Tax in the Sample Period

Contrary to its name, UK Inheritance Tax is levied on the estate of an individual who
dies and not on the recipient of a bequest. When an individual leaves the entirety of
their estate to a spouse or civil partner there is no inheritance tax levied.
Inheritance Tax is a constant rate of 40% of the estate above an exemption threshold indexed to RPI. In 2010, this threshold was £325,000. A major reform imple10
A recent literature has shed light on the effect of housing transaction taxes and their impact on
transaction volumes (Best and Kleven, 2018), sale prices (Besley et al., 2014; Kopczuk and Munroe,
2015; Slemrod et al., 2017) and mobility decisions (Hilber and Lyytikäinen, 2017). A concern is
these findings are driven by younger households who have a higher baseline mobility rate - if this
were true there would be no additional identifying power from these reforms when studying older
households. How strongly older households respond to changes in financial incentives is an empirical
question. My approach draws on Hilber and Lyytikäinen (2017) who study the moving decisions of
working age UK households and find effects on a similar order of magnitude to older households.
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mented on October 9th 2007 increased the exemption threshold by any unused proportion of a deceased spouse or civil partner’s nil-rate band. To illustrate, suppose
the husband died in 2003 and left £50,000 to other heirs and the wife died in 2010.
The exemption threshold for the wife would be £600,000 because she is entitled to the
full amount of her own exemption threshold (£325,000) and the unused proportion
of her husband’s nil-rate band (£325,000 less the £50,000 already bequeathed).

3.2

Housing Transaction Taxes in the Sample Period

The Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) replaced the pre-existing Stamp Duty in 2003, and
is a transaction tax levied on all residential properties in the UK. During the sample
period, the tax takes the form of a percentage rate charged on the whole purchase
price if the price is above a particular threshold. The SDLT varies the average tax
rate creating discontinuous changes, or notches, in the choice set of retirees. There
are numerous changes over the sample period. In 2005 the threshold for the lowest
rate, charged at 1%, doubled and increased again in 2006. In 2011, new higher
rates charged at 5% and 7% for all properties above £1 million and £2 million were
introduced. In addition to these changes, in 2008 the UK government introduced the
‘Stamp Duty Holiday’ a temporary (15 month) increase to the lower threshold from
£125,000 to £175,000 expiring on December 31st 2009. Table A.1 summarizes the
different tax regimes over the duration of my sample.
How do transaction taxes affect retired households? Those with large amounts of
wealth tied up in their home face these costs when moving house. Relative to a world
with no transaction tax this creates large disincentives. For downsizers, transaction
taxes function as an implicit tax on their home equity extraction. For example,
downsizing by £100,000 from a £400,000 house yields an effective 10.2% tax rate.11
Under the SDLT policy the transaction tax levied on the new purchase is £9,000 while £12,000
on the sale gives the 10.2% implicit tax rate on equity withdrawal (40% of £12,000 and 60% of
£9,000). For a a household with a house worth £250,000 downsizing to a house worth £200,000,
releasing 20% of the equity in their home, the effective tax rate on the equity released is 13.2% ( 40%
of £7,500 and 60% of £6,000 divided by the £50,000 base). A substantial body of evidence suggests
effective incidence often falls on sellers irrespective of the statutory incidence. Besley et al. (2014)
estimate 40% of the incidence falls on sellers using variation from the UK ‘Stamp Duty Holiday’. I
use this estimate in the calculation above. Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) present alternative estimates
of transaction tax incidence using New Jersey Mansion taxes and find it is entirely incident on the
seller. In contrast, Slemrod et al. (2017) estimate equal incidence using notches in Washington, DC.
11
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Figure 4: Transaction Taxes, House Values and Mobility
Panel (a): Blue line indicates the tax burden if sold and the red dashed line indicates the Average
Tax Rate around the £250,000 threshold. Panel (b): Circles are mobility rates for deciles of the house
value distribution. The blue dashed shows the predicted fit of a regression of moving on a treatment
indicator and approximating the conditional expectation function (Equation 1) non-parametrically
for the optimal window around the threshold. Further details are provided in Table 2.

3.3

The Impact of Financial Incentives on Moving House

Identifying the effect of housing wealth windfalls in the expenditure and savings
decision of retirees is difficult. Cross-sectional comparisons of high and low housing
wealth households are biased as those with different portfolios may have different
preferences or expectations about the future. Instead, I rely on quasi-experimental
variation in the financial returns to moving house generated by the tax code.
I exploit a discontinuous increase in the housing transaction tax burden using a
regression discontinuity research design to show there is an economic and statistically
significant reduction in home mobility when the financial incentives for moving house
decline. This a reduction in the extensive margin of home equity adjustment or
portfolio rebalancing in response to an exogenous increase in iliquidity.
I focus on a notch at the £250,000 threshold because it remains constant throughout the sample period. Sale values exceeding this threshold experience an increase in
the average tax rate paid on the transaction from 1 to 3%. This is a discontinuous
increase in the SDLT burden of £5,000 (Figure 4a). Shocks to aggregate house prices
throughout the sample create variation in underlying self assessed house values leading to random assignment across this threshold. The outcome variable of interest,
M ovei,t , is a dummy variable denoting a household’s mobility between waves t and
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t + 1 with treatment defined as a house value greater than or equal to £250,000:
M ovei,t = β0 + β1 T reati,t + f (HouseV aluei,t ) + δXi,t + ui,t

(1)

The vector of control variables, Xi,t , includes a polynomial in household age, a
polynomial in PI, household demographics, and wave and region indicators. I present
results approximating the flexible function of house value f (·) in the conditional
expectation function using a non-parametric local linear estimator and quadratic
polynomial with common slope. Additionally, I drop all households more than 30%
below the threshold to avoid contamination from the ‘Stamp Duty Holiday’.
The key identifying assumption is that, conditional on the covariates, ui,t is uncorrelated with the treatment indicator T reati,t . In regression discontinuity frameworks, this is satisfied if other covariates vary smoothly and the forcing variable
(HouseV aluei,t ) cannot be manipulated. Two features of the data reduce the concern of manipulation: first, moving house is measured in the following wave so the
reported home value is predetermined and, second, self assessed home valuation is not
the actual sale price used to calculate the SDLT burden. Manipulation of sale prices
and the implied disincentive to sell is part of the estimated effect. Following Kolesár
and Rothe (2018) standard errors are clustered at the household level and I provide
alternative confidence intervals with guaranteed coverage properties in appendix D.12
Figure 4b plots the results graphically showing a sharp decrease in mobility for
those households who exceed the £250,000 threshold. Table 2 presents results from
the regression analysis using both non-parametric and parametric estimators and
varying the window around the stamp duty threshold included in the regression.
The first row shows the results for the preferred specification using a local linear estimator. For all windows around the discontinuity the non-parametric method yields
similar point estimates. However, for small bands around the cut-off these results
are imprecisely estimated where the sample size is small. For larger bands around
the discontinuity in the SDLT schedule the results are precisely estimated and the
negative effect of an increase in the transaction tax burden is statistically significant.
The parametric specification in the second row has a similar pattern and point estimates. The treatment effect of exposure to higher transaction taxes is negative in
all specifications and the magnitude of the effect is robust to alternative estimation
12

Appendix D also provides results for different order polynomials and additional robustness tests.
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CEF
Approximation
Non-parametric
Local Linear
Parametric
Quadratic

N

Band around cuttoff
20%
25%
30%

10%

15%

Optimal (47%)

-0.0278

-0.0341

-0.0356∗

-0.0303∗∗

-0.0287∗∗

-0.0285∗∗

(0.0334)

(0.0247)

(0.0189)

(0.0155)

(0.0141)

(0.0140)

-0.0365

-0.0450∗∗

-0.0270∗∗

-0.0218∗

-0.0265∗∗

(0.0241)

(0.0193)

(0.0133)

(0.0130)

(0.0112)

-727.9
1224

-877.5
1559

-2118
3023

-2110
3233

-2873
3979

4348

All regressions additionally control for wave fixed effects, a polynomial in age, household
demographics, a polynomial in permanent income and region dummies (Equation 1). Following
Kolesár and Rothe (2018), Standard Errors are clustered by household and optimal bandwidth
selection follows Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) . The Akike Information Criterion is shown in
italics for the parametric specification. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.5, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Table 2: The Effect of Transaction Taxes on Household Mobility
windows and methods for approximating the conditional expectation function.
The estimates of exposure to higher transaction taxes, a 2.85 percentage point
reduction in mobility for the optimal bandwidth, show increases in transaction taxes
for retirees are both economically and statistically significant. The fraction of retirees
moving house falls by 50% in response to a reduction in the financial returns to moving
house - highlighting the empirical relevance of a housing windfall mechanism.

4

A Model of Savings After Retirement

The previous sections highlights both extensive and intensive margin adjustments
to retirees’ portfolios. To better understand their responses to changing financial
incentives over the whole retirement period, this section introduces a model of their
savings decisions. The model generates key empirical results in Section 2 and sheds
light on how this mechanism interacts with the design of social insurance. It includes
a rich model of housing decisions incorporating institutional features from the UK.
Households face idiosyncratic and exogenous risk in health status, mortality, LTC
expenditures, and, for couples, the structure of their household. In addition, households are exposed to aggregate risk in the form of a common stochastic process for
house prices. Retirees are partially insured by the tax and transfer system including
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means-tested transfers for LTC expenses.
Retirees begin retirement single or in a couple. For couples, the survivor continues
as single if their spouse dies and I assume singles cannot remarry. Family structure
and gender affect utility, health transitions, mortality, LTC costs and income.
Each period, a household chooses their expenditure on non-housing consumption,
the size of the house they wish to live in, and the stock of financial assets for the next
period. Financial assets are perfectly liquid and yield risk free return r. There is no
borrowing.13 Housing assets require maintenance to offset depreciation at rate δ and
have a price ph which households take as given. Renters, with zero housing wealth,
rent housing services at a fraction of the sale price rh or can purchase a house.
At the beginning of each period, households observes their age, PI, who is alive
in the household, liquid wealth, housing wealth, health, LTC expense shock and the
level of aggregate house prices. Decisions are made after shocks are observed and new
shocks arrive at the end of the period after decisions have been made.
To capture a key source of non-stationarity in the policy environment of retirees
and to leverage it as an additional source of identifying variation, I allow estate and
transaction tax rules to change over time. This creates additional variation in the
financial incentives retirees face over time. For simplicity, I describe the model for
a single policy regime. When solving and simulating the model during estimation, I
assume policy changes are unanticipated14 , solving it under each policy regime.

4.1

Demographics

A household is either a single man, single woman, or a couple. The state variable f
is the family structure describing their demographics.
f ∈ {Single Man, Single Woman, Couple}
13

(2)

I discussion the empirical support for this assumption in Appendix E.
The exception is “Stamp Duty Holiday” where. In this case, I treat the reversal of the policy
as perfectly anticipated in line with the institutional context of the temporary cut.
14
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4.2

Preferences

Preferences are time separable, with a constant discount factor β. Households maximize expected utility and the per-period utility function is given by:
u(f, c, s) =

nf ( α1n cσ s1−σ )1−γ − 1
1−γ

,

(3)

where c is non-housing consumption and s denotes housing services. The number of
adults, n, is a deterministic function of family status, f , with αn the consumption
equivalence scale for total consumption. In this specification, γ is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion and σ is the weight of non-housing consumption relative to
housing services. Owner occupied housing yields housing services at the rate 1 + ω.15
I assume bequests are only possible when the final surviving member of the household has died. Bequests, b, are the net of tax consolidated value of the estate and
utility from bequests, takes the form of a warm glow bequest motive (Andreoni, 1989;
De Nardi, 2004). The functional form for φi (b) is given by:
φi (b) =

φi1 (φi2 + b)(1−γ) − 1
,
1−γ

(4)

where φi1 controls the weight on bequests relative to lifetime consumption, while φi2
controls the curvature and the extent to which bequests are a luxury good.16 This
simple specification is consistent with altruism (as in Abel and Warshawsky, 1988)
or other interpretations of the bequest motive (e.g.the strategic motive in Bernheim
et al., 1985, or egoism). Allowing these parameters to vary across households is a
parsimonious and tractable way of incorporating heterogeneity in families without
taking a stance on the form of the bequest motive or modelling multiple generations.
Additionally, durable goods providing consumption flows, such as housing, lower the
cost of leaving an inheritance. Consequently, this heterogeneity allows for greater
15

ω affects the relative price of renting housing services and captures benefits from ageing in place
as a homeowner. For retirees, the ability to make modifications to their home may be more valuable
as their health and mobility decline. Additionally, many retirees who rent are either in public housing
or LTC facilities and may experience lower quality housing. Alternatively, they may directly value
the additional commitment benefit offered by homeownership when interacting with their children
(Barczyk et al., 2019). I impose a within period Cobb-Douglas aggregator for total consumption as
many studies, such as Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2011), find constant housing expenditure shares.
16
For positive φi2 marginal utility of small bequests is bounded, while the marginal utility of large
bequests declines more slowly than consumption.
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flexibility in both inter- and intra-temporal patterns of substitution at older ages.

4.3

Income, Health, Mortality and LTC Spending

Income Households earn a return r on their financial assets a. Non-asset pension
income y is deterministic and depends on age j, current family structure f (which
captures size and gender) and PI I:
y = y(j, f, I)

(5)

In addition to an Estate Tax, τb , and Stamp Duty levied on housing transactions,
τh , income taxes, τy , are due on income from pensions and financial assets.
Health Status Health status takes one of three values for living household members
m ∈ {Good, Bad, ADL, Dead},

(6)

and transitions according to a flexible age, family structure and PI dependent Markov
process. Allowing the process to vary with PI and family composition captures differences in health investment that are not modelled directly. The direct effects of
aging, health status, and gender on health production or deterioration are also captured by the Markov process. Following Ameriks et al. (2020) I use difficulties with
Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) to define the worst health state. ADL measures
capture a range of needs associated with institutional LTC use and community care.
For couples, m denotes a pair with a health status for each member - for notational
convenience I continue to use m to denote the nine valued health status for the couple.
Mortality Individuals face exogenous mortality risk depending on age, family structure, health status and PI. η(j, I, m, f ) denotes household survival probabilities.
LTC Spending For US retirees, out-of-pocket medical expenditure risk is an important driver of precautionary savings. In the UK, comprehensive coverage for acute
and chronic medical expenses is free at the point of use. However, LTC risks pose
considerable out-of-pocket risk with lifetime costs exceeding £100,000 for 10% of individuals (Dilnot et al., 2011). The National Health Service (NHS) provides coverage
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for acute and chronic expenses for the entire UK population.
I define mxj as the flow of all LTC expenses incurred between j and j − 1. Consistent with evidence of limited income elasticity for LTC needs (e.g. Ameriks et al.,
2020), they are exogenous and depend on current and previous period health status
and family structure, PI, age, and a standard normal idiosyncratic shock, mx,j :
ln mxj (·) =µmx (mj−1 , mj , I, fj−1 , fj , j) + σmx (mj−1 , mj , I, fj−1 , fj , j) × mx,j

(7)

The government acts as a payer of last resort for LTC expenses when individuals
have insufficient resources or when resources are exhausted paying LTC expenses.
This imposes a 100% marginal tax rate on private resources by requiring retirees
first spend down their wealth. Following Hubbard et al. (1994, 1995), I model this
means-tested benefit as a health state dependent consumption floor, cmin . Couples
are subject to different means-testing rules that cap their spending at 50% of their
joint financial assets when only one spouse has LTC needs. In other words, 100% of
their house and 50% of their remaining wealth are not subject to the spend down
requirement. I allow the floor to depend on family structure capturing additional
insurance and incentives to hold wealth in housing for couples.

4.4

Housing Market and House Prices

Moving house is costly. I model two types of cost: the statutory transaction tax and
additional financial costs. The total value of a house, h, is ph h and if a household
adjusts their housing stock they must pay the following adjustment cost:
Q(ht+1 , ht , ph,t ) = 1[ht+1 6= ht ] ×

ph,t ht+1 − ph,t ht (1 − π) + F
+(1 − κ) · τh (ph,t ht+1 ) + κ · τh (ph,t ht )

!
(8)

The total cost consists of three parts. First, the change in housing evaluated at today’s
price net of a proportional cost π. The proportional component of the transaction
cost allows the costs to vary between houses of different values or sizes.17 Second, a
fixed cost, F , capturing the invariant component. Third, the transaction tax, τh (·),
with incidence on the seller κ ∈ [0, 1]. Allowing for the effective incidence to differ
17
The financial value of hassle costs vary with size because larger houses require moving, or disposing of, more possessions or take longer to sell in thinner markets. Real costs may be proportional
because the intricacy of legal agreements or surveying varies with the property value or size.
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from the statutory incidence incorporates incentives to manipulate sale prices without
modelling the bargaining protocol or other features of the real estate market.
Homeowners must pay a proportional maintenance cost, δ, each period. Current
renters, who may choose to purchase, rent housing services at a fraction rh of the sale
price. Consequently, rental prices include housing market volatility.
House prices are stochastic and their log evolves as a standard AR(1) process:
ln(ph,t+1 ) = µh + ρh ln(ph,t ) + h,t+1 ,

h,t+1 ∼ N (0, σh2 )

(9)

Drift µh reflects trend growth in house prices. This formulation is common and fits
the data at both individual and aggregate levels well (see Nagaraja et al., 2011; Berger
et al., 2018, respectively). I model aggregate house price movements, thus, the price
level is common to all households in time period t.

4.5

Recursive Formulation and Household Problem

I describe the recursive formulation for a current homeowner (renters differ only in
terms of rental expenditures). Letting at denote the liquid wealth of retirees in time
period t and r denote their return, total post tax income is τy (r at + yt (·), τ, ft ) with
vector τ summarizing the tax system. To economize on state variables, I follow
Deaton (1991) and redefine the problem in terms of cash-on-hand

xt = at − δht + τy r at + yt , τ, ft + trt − mxt ,

(10)

which has the following law of motion

xt+1 =xt − ct − Q(ht+1 , ht , ph,t ) − δht+1 − mxt+1 + τy r at+1 + yt+1 , τ + trt+1 (11)
where savings, which are constrained to be non-negative, are given by
at+1 = xt − ct − Q(ht+1 , ht , ph,t ) ≥ 0,

∀t.

(12)

Cash-on-hand is net of housing maintenance costs and LTC expenses, but includes
income after taxes and transfers. The tax function accounts for means-tested transfers
excluding those covering LTC expenses. Means-tested transfers, trt (·), bridge the gap
between a minimum consumption floor and a household’s resources and provide a
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ceiling for couples’ LTC expenses. Define the resources available next period after
tax, but before government transfers with

xg
t+1 =at+1 − δht+1 − mxt+1 + τy r at+1 + yt+1 , τ, ft .

(13)

Consistent with assistance for LTC expenses which depends on total resources, housing, health, and family structure, government transfers are defined as

trt (e
xt , ft , ht , mt , ph,t ) = max 0, cmin (ft , ht , mt ) − (e
xt − xD,t − hD,t )

(14)

where xD,t and hD,t are exemptions (or disregards) on combined liquid assets and
income and housing assets respectively.18 The law of motion for cash-on-hand next
period can thus be rewritten as
xt+1 = x
et+1 + trt+1 (e
xt+1 , ft+1 , ht+1 , mt+1 , ph,t+1 ).

(17)

Finally, bequests are exposed to LTC costs and constrained to be non-negative,
thus, the after tax value of their consolidated wealth is given by:
bt = τb (max{Q(0, ht+1 , ph,t ) + at+1 − mxt+1 , 0}).

(18)

The recursive formulation depends on i due to idiosyncratic preferences for bequests. The state variables of a household are given by Ω = (j, f, I, m, h, x, ph ) with
next period values denoted by a prime. These variables are: age (j), family structure
(f ), PI (I), health status (m), housing stock (h), cash-on-hand (x), and the aggregate
18

Households who cannot afford the minimum level of consumption after liquidating their assets
must sell their house and spend all wealth. They begin next period as renters and receive transfers
to meet the consumption floor. Disregards are functions of state variables following the rules summarized in Section 4.3, let m1t and m2t denote health for arbitrary individuals within the household:
xD,t =XD (ft , x
et , mt ) = 1[m1t = ADL ∩ m2t 6= ADL ∩ ft = couple] × x
et /2

hD,t =HD (ft , ht ph,t , mt ) = 1

[m1t

= ADL ∩
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m2t

6= ADL ∩ ft = couple] × ht ph,t

(15)
(16)

house price level (ph ). The recursive problem for homeowner i is:
n
i
(Ω0 ) Ω, h0 , a0 ]
Vji (Ω) = max{c,h0 ,a0 } u(f, c, s) + +β · η(j, I, m, f )E[Vj+1
o
i
0 0
+ β(1 − η(j, I, m, f ))E[φ (b) Ω, h , a ] ,

(19)

subject to equations (2)-(9) and(12)-(17) and bequests are constrained by (18). Households choose non-housing consumption, c, savings in financial assets (before LTC
costs), a0 , and the new housing stock, h0 . They form expectations over individual
mortality, family structure tomorrow, f 0 , household health, m0 , the transitory component of LTC expenses, mx , and the level of house prices, p0h . LTC expense risk
implies households form expectations over realized cash-on-hand tomorrow, x0 , and
the possibility they are compelled to sell their house to finance LTC costs.

5

Estimation

I adopt a two-stage estimation strategy. In the first stage I estimate (or calibrate using
existing evidence) parameters that can be cleanly identified outside of the model. I
fix the consumption floor and household equivalence scales based on pre-existing
evidence. Additionally, I discretize latent preference heterogeneity into K groups
using a k-means algorithm to reduce dimensionality (Bonhomme et al., 2021).
In the second stage I estimate the remaining model parameters, the discount
factor, risk aversion, weight on housing, homeownership premium, transaction costs
and heterogeneous bequest parameters,
θ = (β, γ, σ, ω, F, π, {φk1 , φk2 }K
k=1 ),

(20)

using the method of simulated moments (MSM) and taking the first stage parameters
and groups as given. The value of these parameters minimises the weighted distance
between simulated moment conditions and the data using a GMM criterion function
θ̂ arg min G(θ)0 W G(θ),
θ∈Θ

(21)

with W the inverse-diagonal weighting matrix. The target moment conditions are:
1. For initial homeowners, I match mean liquid and housing wealth by age, PI,
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and cohort. For renters, I match mean liquid wealth by age and cohort.
2. I match mean subjective bequest probabilities by age, PI, and cohort for initial
homeowners and by age and cohort for initial renters. I use the self-reported
probability of leaving a bequest greater than £150,000.
3. Moving is costly, but liberates liquidity from housing. Thus, I match the fraction
of initial homeowners moving house and homeownership rates by age and cohort.
The MSM approach is standard. Appendix G provides a detailed description. Due
to the frequency of tax reforms, I do not explicitly target pre and post periods or the
level and treatment effect using indirect inference. Instead, target moments embed
behavioural responses to longitudinal variation in tax policy. In addition, I use estimates of the effect of transaction taxes from the regression discontinuity design to
validate the model so do not target this explicitly in estimation.

5.1

Identification

Separately identifying precautionary and bequest motives is a long standing challenge
(De Nardi et al., 2016b; Lockwood, 2018). I combine data on wealth composition and
subjective bequest probabilities with exogenous policy reforms (discussed in detail in
Section 3), and variation in house prices over time.
Policy reforms shift the returns and risks associated with holding different assets
and moving house. Along with house price changes, this creates longitudinal variation
in incentives which provides an additional source of identification as it requires the
model to match changes in behaviour when incentives change. Additionally, how
decisions vary with age and across the PI distribution uses differences in health,
mortality and LTC expense risks to identify the model.19 In complex non-linear
models, all moments potentially influence all parameters, however, I provide intuition
for why particular moments are more informative about certain parts of the model.
19

Even when panel data is available, many MSM approaches match repeated cross sections or
pool time periods. Instead, this paper’s approach accounts for, and exploits, multiple sources of
non-stationarity over time. This uses cross cohort comparisons where the fully specified model
controls for differences across households in a given calendar year. I assume preference parameters
in the structural model are unaffected by policy or house price changes - an exclusion restriction. How
these comparisons vary with age and PI provides additional identifying variation due to differences
in income, expected longeveity and future LTC expenses. Those with low PI face lower longevity
(Table 3) and higher LTC costs while alive. In contrast, those with higher PI survive for longer and
experience lower LTC costs. These differences help pin down the demand for self-insurance.
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Parameters in the period utility function Households vary in their ability to
self-insure LTC costs by their level of wealth and the risks they face vary with age
and PI. Their liquid wealth determines their ability to self-insure in the short run.
Matching liquid wealth identifies risk aversion γ. The total level of wealth captures
their ability to self-insure over longer horizons and the extent of life cycle saving
identifying β the intertemporal discount factor.
Renters’ savings and expenditure strongly respond to the consumption share of
housing, σ, because it determines their expenditure share on rent. House prices
changes create variation in renters’ spending, saving and demand for liquid buffers
identifying σ. In contrast, I identify the benefits of homeownership, ω, by matching
the behaviour of initial owners: the fraction remaining homeowners by age and cohort.
The Cost of Moving Retirees move house when the benefits exceed the costs.
Variation in the size of transaction taxes lead to differences in these costs. Household
responses to these changes is informative about the size of the estimated costs of
moving, π and F , relative to the observed tax costs.
Bequest Motives The reform to estate taxation shifts the return to saving for a
bequest without changing the utility of future lifetime consumption. The extent to
which households adjust their savings decisions in response to this tax reform helps
identify the bequest utility parameters. As bequests are slow to adjust and only
realised at death, I match information on expected future bequests. This survey
measure provides information on the savings of each household under both estate
tax regimes - allowing the econometrician to fully exploit the reform without the
infeasible requirement that the same household’s bequest is observed under both tax
regimes. Information on each household’s future bequests allows me to identify the
average strength of bequest motives, but also heterogeneity in the population.

5.2

Econometric Concerns

Non-stationarity introduced by cohort and time effects could lead to biased estimates
of model parameters. Wealth holdings at the same age may differ due to differences
in income growth, asset prices, asset growth or public policy over the life cycle. Cross
sectional moments may attribute differences between cohorts to differences in savings
rates by age resulting in biased parameter estimates.
25

By sampling household initial conditions, controlling flexibly for household PI,
and simulating the sequence of observed aggregate shocks20 and policy reforms faced
in their retirement I replicate differences across cohorts and time periods. I construct
moment conditions by cohort and calendar year to eliminate this source of potential
bias. Formally, this paper makes two important assumptions: first, cohort effects are
summarized by their composition and initial characteristics and, second, relevant time
effects are captured by policy reforms and changing house prices. This is a structural
approach to the age-time-cohort problem which explicitly accounts for differences
across households and leverages policy reforms for identification.
Individual mortality is negatively correlated with lifetime income, thus surviving
members of a cohort are wealthier on average. To address “mortality bias” (and
sample attrition) in the simulations each household is given an observed sequence of
mortality, health, and attrition shocks. This is the observed sequence for the data
household who provide their initial conditions; therefore any sample selection in the
unbalanced ELSA panel is exactly replicated in the simulated panel.

6

Estimation Results

Section 2 reports some of the key facts about housing and liquid wealth I require
the estimated model to match. In this section I report a subset of the most relevant
features of the first stage model estimates, and discuss second stage estimates.

6.1

First Stage Estimates

The risks and financial incentives facing retirees are key drivers of their saving behaviour and the benefits of different assets, I report the most important results from
first stage estimates here and provide complete details in Appendix H.
Mortality and Health Transitions I estimate survival and health status transition probabilities in ELSA using a multinomial logit approach allowing transitions to
depend on age, family size, health status and PI. I define the ADL state as individuals
with two or more limitations and describe ELSA’s measures in Appendix H. Table
20

Fagereng et al. (2019) argue asset price growth can substantially overstate active saving rates.
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PI
Percentile

Singles
10th
50th
90th
Couples
10th
50th
90th

Men in
Good Health
Life
ADL
Expectancy Years

Men in
Bad Health
Life
ADL
Expectancy Years

Women
Good Health
Life
ADL
Expectancy Years

Women in
Bad Health
Life
ADL
Expectancy Years

13.65
16.91
19.57

2.02
2.32
1.58

11.23
14.91
17.83

2.85
2.92
1.87

18.21
20.02
20.93

2.57
2.65
1.91

16.38
19.14
20.03

3.82
3.82
2.66

13.31
16.79
19.29

2.15
2.36
1.57

10.95
15.10
17.40

3.02
3.21
2.19

19.18
21.19
21.89

3.92
4.07
2.65

17.99
20.65
20.88

5.60
5.48
3.56

Conditional on surviving to age 66. ADL years defined by spell with 2 or more difficulties. For
couples the calculation assumes both spouses have the same health at age 66

Table 3: Life Expectancy & Expected Duration of ADL difficulties
3 summarizes simulated health and mortality trajectories using these estimates, revealing an important PI gradient to life expectancy for both men and women. Men
at the 90th percentile of the PI distribution live 6 years longer than those at the 10th
percentile. For women, the difference is halved. Those with lower PI ranks spend
longer living with ADL limitations when alive and women both live longer and spend
a greater proportion of retirement with ADL limitations irrespective of initial health.
Long Term Care Costs Micro-data on the LTC expenses of UK retirees is scarce.
However, Banks et al. (2019) document costs reported by US households in the HRS
line up closely with available measures in ELSA. Motivated by this, I estimate the LTC
expense process described in equation (7) using the HRS. Effectively this imputes LTC
costs across countries. To capture NHS coverage of other medical expenses, health
costs are 0 unless a household member has ADL needs.
Consumption Floor The consumption floor, which replicates the effective value
of receiving public assistance including any stigma or disutility from receiving state
care rather than a statutory value, is taken from Ameriks et al. (2011). For couples
this value is equivalized. I calibrate this parameter using US evidence because there
is limited information on who pays for LTC expenses or the deacumulation of wealth
by those entering nursing homes in the ELSA data.
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Group
Homeowner Wealth PI Bequest Index
N
Share
Type I
5.5%
24,200 29.4
-17.6
1,296 24.59%
Type II
98.0%
184,600 47.1
-25.21
1,487 28.22%
Type III
98.5%
323,400 34.6
35.0
1,169 22.18%
Type IV
98.6%
640,500 83.7
10.9
1,318 25.01%
Table 4: Distribution of Latent Household Types
Latent Types Equation 4 specifies idiosyncratic preference heterogeneity parametrically. I approximate latent heterogeneity with K = 4 groups, then estimate group
specific parameters treating bequest preferences as non-linear group fixed effects.
Classification flexibly partitions households into K groups, K = {k(i)}ni=1 , as an
unrestricted function of household level observations, zi , to minimise within cluster
sum of squared errors. The vector zi uniquely recovers the underlying latent heterogeneity as panel length grows: the injecitvity assumption (Bonhomme et al., 2021).
I select zi motivated by existing empirical evidence and economic theory and use:
initial homeownership status, initial wealth, PI and a bequest preference index constructed from beliefs over future bequests. The first three elements parsimoniously
capture life cycle savings and income incorporating correlation between preferences
and initial conditions. These are exogenous, but are the outcomes of working life
choices. Houses lower the opportunity cost of bequests consumption because they
provide a consumption flow. Retirement wealth is determined by early life choices
(Venti and Wise, 1998) and stronger bequest motives lead to more wealth accumulation. Combining retirement wealth with PI exploits heterogeneity in lifetime saving
rates, distinguishing lifetime spenders (high income, low retirement wealth) from
savers (vice versa). Finally, the bequest preference index is a measure of systematic
differences in future bequests unexplained by current state variables. I construct a
household fixed effect by regressing subjective bequest probabilities on flexible controls for observable state variables. Full details are provided in Appendix H.
Table 4 reports the distribution over types21 and group means for elements of zi .
Type I are low wealth and PI initial renters who are systematically less likely to leave
a bequest. Type IV are the highest wealth and PI homeowners. Types II and III
divide remaining homeowners into ‘spenders’ with higher PI, but lower wealth and
21

While any labelling is ad hoc, I order types by the average value of initial wealth.

28

Parameter
β

Description

Type I

Type II

Annual Discount Factor

Type III

Type IV

0.957
(0.00326)

γ

CRRA

3.98
(0.0291)

σ

0.567

Consumption Weight

(0.00298)

ω

Ownership Premium

1.15
(0.0379)

F

Fixed Transaction Cost

13,288

π

Proportional Transaction Cost

14.2%

φ0

Bequest Weight

(96.2)
(0.313%)

69.2
(96.45)

φ1

Bequest Shifter (1,000s)

5.34×10−4

(2.276×10−3 )

97.9

21.1

(4.89)

(3.05)

602.9

66.6

70.2

46.9

(1587.583)

(29.9)

(6.49)

(26.4)

Standard Errors correct for simulation error and are calculated using the asymptotic variance of
the GMM estimator (see Appendix G for details). I report annual values where appropriate.

Table 5: Estimated Parameters
low probability of leaving a bequest and ‘savers’ who are their opposites.

6.2

Second Stage Estimates

Table 5 reports the second stage estimates beginning with parameters common across
households. The discount factor, β, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, are
in line with typical life cycle estimates. Together with the estimated weight on nonhousing consumption, σ, an intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption
is 0.37 which is standard (see Havránek, 2015, for a meta-analysis).
Taken together, estimated transaction costs imply housing assets have substantial
adjustment costs. These are larger than values estimated for younger households.
Cocco (2005) argues financial costs often reach 8-10% of the seller’s home value excluding the effect of disruption. For older households, disruptions are likely to be
large as even geographically small moves can isolate them from their community and
support network. Furthermore, these estimates include the cost of delay (or ‘fire
sale’) as health deteriorates and imediate care needs rise. The utility premium of
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Figure 5: Bequest Allocation
Panel (a): expenditure share allocated to bequests for estimated types facing certain death. Panel
(b): expenditure shares using estimates in De Nardi et al. (2010) (DFJ), Lockwood (2018), Ameriks
et al. (2020) (ABCST), Nakajima and Telyukova (2020) (N&T), and Lee and Tan (2019) (L&T).

homeownership shows retirees value the benefits of aging in place. Rental options are
typically either (lower quality) social housing or assisted living facilities restricting
the independence of retirees or their ability to modify their home. This estimate is
smaller than similar models (e.g. Nakajima and Telyukova, 2020) as the ability to
downsize on the intensive margin makes homeownership more attractive.
Estimates for the weight and curvature of the bequest function are difficult to
interpret. To aid comparison, Figure 5 reports the share of resources a single retiree
facing certain death at the end of the period allocates to bequests.22
The left panel shows bequest allocations for each of the estimated types. There is
a large amount of heterogeneity in the strength of the estimated bequest motives with
Types I and II having effectively no bequest motives (Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007, find
a similar binary distinction). Extrapolating Type I estimates imply motives operative
at higher levels of wealth, however, behaviour at this level is not identified as it lies
outside the range of observed wealth holdings for Type I. Turning to those with positive bequest motives, estimates for Types III and IV imply similar allocations among
those making positive bequests. Estimates for those with positive motives lie within
the range of estimates in the literature shown in the right panel. They are stronger
than Nakajima and Telyukova (2020), who model a homeownership decision, and
Ameriks et al. (2020) who model the financial wealth of a wealthier population and
22

Full details of this calculation for all studies are given in appendix I

30

2.5

Liquid Wealth £100,000s

Housing Wealth £100,000s

4

3

2

1
65

75

85

95

2
1.5
1
.5
0
65

75

Age
Top PI
Model

2nd PI
Model

85

95

Age
Bottom 50% PI
Model

Top PI
Model

(a) Mean Housing Wealth

2nd PI
Model

Bottom 50% PI
Model

(b) Mean Liquid Wealth

Figure 6: Model Fit - Wealth Profiles (Initial Owners, ELSA Data & Simulations)
Solid lines: cohorts aged 64-68, 74-78 and 84-88 in 2002. Dashed lines: model simulations.

match strategic survey responses, but weaker than estimates assuming all wealth is
liquid. This suggests modeling illiquidity and the demand for housing is key. Furthermore, estimated parameters correlate with lifetime spenders and savers, suggesting a
simple model of luxury bequests may be consistent with behaviour after retirement,
but not necessarily with accumulation before.

6.3

Model Fit

I require the model to match observed heterogeneity in portfolios, expected bequests,
and housing choices by age, cohort, and PI levels. Specifically I target average housing
wealth, liquid wealth and the probability of leaving an inheritance conditional on PI
group, by cohort and age, for initial owners and these moments unconditional on PI
for initial renters. I also target average homeownership and mobility rates for initial
owners by age and cohort. These moments identify retirees’ demand for housing,
precautionary savings, and heterogeneity in bequest motives. I present a subset of
the targets here, for birth cohorts shown in Section 2, with the rest in Appendix J.
Figure 6 highlights important features of retiree portfolios over the sample. The
left panel shows housing wealth sharply increases and gradually declines throughout
the sample for all cohorts. While there is large variation in the level of housing assets
by PI, this trend is common to all PI groups. In contrast, the liquid wealth of initial
owners declines with age and lower PI retirees dissave more slowly from their liquid
wealth. The estimated model matches all of these aspects of the data.
31

Simulations
ELSA
N

Band around cuttoff
20%
25%

10%

15%

30%

Optimal

-0.0263
-0.0278

-0.0239
-0.0341

-0.0190
-0.0356∗

-0.0184
-0.0303∗∗

-0.0174
-0.0287∗∗

-0.0181
-0.0285∗∗

(0.0334)

(0.0247)

(0.0189)

(0.0155)

(0.0141)

(0.0140)

1224

1559

3023

3233

3979

4348

Regressions using simulated and ELSA data using identical estimating equation in Equation 1.
ELSA results are reproduced from Table 2 in Section 3. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.5, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Table 6: Transaction Taxes and Household Mobility: Model vs Data

6.4

Validation against Quasi-Experimental Evidence

I use moments of the data not targeted in estimation to test the model’s goodness of
fit - a notch in the transaction tax schedule and its effect on moving house estimated
using a regression discontinuity design in Section 3. This a strict test of the model’s
validity as it is required to generate local responses to variation in tax incentives
as well as global responses from longitudinal variation in tax incentives embedded
in target moments. Importantly, this requires the magnitude of a key mechanism
in the model matches the data: how households respond to changes in the financial incentive to transform housing wealth into liquid assets. This is important for
predicting behaviour in counterfactual exercises and showing the model reproduces
quasi-experimental evidence improves the credibility of these exercises. I estimate an
identical equation in simulated data and the ELSA data reported in Table 6.
For all bandwiths, point estimates in the simulated data are a similar order of
magnitude and lie within one standard error of the ELSA point estimates. Model
estimates are slightly smaller than their data counterparts, but point estimates in the
simulated data are economically and statistically comparable to the responses in the
data. This suggests the model is able to reproduce both population level responses
to tax variation (embedded in the moments) while also producing local responses to
variation. This lends considerable support for the magnitude of the liquidity demand
and housing windfall channels in the following counterfactual exercises.
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Shock
Income
House Price

Marginal Propensity to
Consume
Bequeath
0.12
0.38
0.033
0.25

Simulated responses for a single birth cohort to a one-time 5% increase in income and a one-time
5% increase in house prices. Annual MPC is measured at age 70 when shocks arrive and reported.

Table 7: Household Responses to Unanticipated Shocks

7

Responses to Unanticipated Shocks

To understand the joint role of portfolios and retirement windfalls, I use the estimated
model as a laboratory simulating consumption and saving responses to ceteris paribus
increases in housing wealth or cash-on-hand, a proxy for lump sum pension payouts.
I simulate changes for a single cohort, those born between 1925 and 1929, take
the joint distribution of their initial state variable as given, and assign each member
of the cohort the age of 68 (the average age in the first wave of ELSA rounded to be
consistent with the length of model periods). Housing wealth windfalls occur at age
70 due to an increase in the level of house prices by 5%. After age 70 the future house
prices continue to follow the AR(1) process described in Equation 9 and thus the
effect of the unanticipated shock is persistent, but not necessarily permanent. The
cash-on-hand windfall is parameterized as an one-time tax rebate (See e.g. Parker
et al., 2013; Kaplan and Violante, 2014; Misra and Surico, 2014) at age 70 delivering
the same 5% increase in after tax income. Neither windfall is anticipated.
To understand how households respond to changes in their portfolio and total
wealth, I report two measures in Table 7: the aggregate Marginal Propensity to
Consume (MPC) for annual non-housing consumption and the aggregate Marginal
Propensity to Bequeath (MPB).23 The MPC is measured when the shock arrives
and captures contemporaneous non-housing consumption responses. The MPB is
measured at death, summarizing how wealth is used over the remaining life cycle.
Turning first to the MPCs. At the arrival of the shock, the contemporaneous MPC
23

I compute household level measure and explicitly aggregate households in the model. Thus, the
results I present here depend on the distribution of initial state variables in this cohort. MPBs are
net all expenditures including adjustment costs and LTC expenses. Average MPBs reported below
use the PDV of bequests and integrate over all uncertainty in their remaining lifetime including
mortality and health risk, house price changes and medical expense risk.
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Figure 7: Marginal Propensity to Bequeath by Liquidity
Panel (a): the Average MPB along the distribution of illiqiud wealth. Solid line is the response to a
house price windfall and dashed line is the response to a pension windfall (tax rebate) both received
at age 70. See Table 7. Panel (b): The distribution of households’ illiquid wealth shares at age 70

out of a transitory income shock is larger than the housing wealth shock and both
estimates are within the range of estimates in the respective literatures.24 They imply
that for an additional £1 of wealth at age 70, a household consumes an additional 15
pence when they experience an income shock and 3 pence when they experience an
increase in house prices. Retirees use housing wealth windfalls to finance retirement
spending, but the consumption increase is smaller than from pension windfalls.
In both experiments, a large, economically significant fraction of one generation’s
good luck is shared with the next. 1/4 of the house price shock’s PDV is transmitted
to bequests. However, the transmission of the income shock is over 1.5 times larger.25
Households respond differently to the two shocks over time - especially those who
are liquidity constrained or likely to be during their remaining lifetime. In response to
an income shock, low wealth households with larger housing portfolio shares are less
likely to downsize. Marginal downsizers in the baseline have more cash available to
spend today and find downsizing less attractive. These households no longer liquidate
housing wealth, no longer pay adjustment costs and retain additional housing returns
because the income shock alleviates liquidity constraints in some states of the world.
This effectively increases their lifetime saving.
24

For example, Aladangady (2017) finds an MPC out of housing wealth of 0.047 on the dollar.
The order of magnitude is consistent with the estimated MPB out of social security income in
Lee and Tan (2019), but substantially larger than the MPB in Altonji and Villanueva (2007).
25
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MPC by Type
Shock
Income
House Price

I
0.16
0.031

II
0.16
0.031

III
0.074
0.033

MPB by Type
IV
0.12
0.032

I
II
III
IV
0.33 0.32 0.47 0.41
0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24

Simulated responses for a single birth cohort to a one-time 5% increase in income and a one-time
5% increase in house prices. Annual MPC is measured at age 70 when shocks arrive and reported.
To isolate the effect of preferences, the correlation with initial conditions is set to 0.

Table 8: Household Responses to Unanticipated Shocks by Latent Type
In contrast, an unanticipated increase in the value of housing wealth actually reduces the savings of these same households over their remaining lifespan. Marginal
households increase the frequency with which they move house to access otherwise
trapped home equity because the financial return to downsizing has grown. Households increase their cash-on-hand by similar amounts to the liquid wealth windfall,
but this is now driven by changes in the intensive and extensive margins of downsizing. Thus, retirees who face liquidity constraints, either today or in some future states
of the world, behave differently when they experience the two windfalls. When house
prices increase, they use this additional wealth to relax liquidity constraints, but do
so by economizing on housing consumption and bequests. They pay large adjustment
costs in the process. Constrained households and how they trade off housing for
liquidity is the key driver of differences in the MPB.26 Figure 7 displays this heterogeneity along the distribution of the illiquid wealth share, the ratio of illiquid wealth
to total resources. In line with standard intuition, those with high liquidity have
larger MPBs out of housing wealth. However, the population of households at the
margin of lifetime adjustment drives the aggregate reversal.
While liquidity constraints are important, there is considerable heterogeneity
across retirees. Table 8 highlights another key dimension: Types I and II who have
weaker bequest motives have larger consumption responses to pension windfalls and
smaller MPBs.27 In contrast, there are smaller differences in the response to house
price shocks. Declining health has a similar effect, increasing MPCs and lowering
26

House prices are persistent not permanent: the mechanical effect of the house price shock at age
70 declines. Even if they do not adjust their behaviour after a house price shock, its transmission
to bequests will be smaller. However, estimated parameters imply this effect is negligible
27
To isolate the effect of preferences from heterogeneity in initial conditions Table 8 additionally
eliminates the correlation between preferences and initial conditions
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MPBs, as households face lower survival probabilities and an increase in the probability of catastrophic LTC expenses - reducing effective planning horizons.

8

Differential Means-Testing of LTC Benefits

Means-tested benefits for households who have large LTC expenditures, but limited
private resources are common (OECD, 2011). In the UK, means-testing is applied at
the individual level and a single retiree must spend down their private assets (housing
and liquid wealth) before qualifying for public assistance.
Applying individual means-testing to couples requires allocating joint resources
to each spouse. The UK government assigns 50% of the joint financial wealth to the
spouse with LTC needs and 50% to their partner. In contrast, they assign 100% of
the house to the healthy partner.28 Consequently, couples no longer face an implicit
spend down tax rate of 100%. This insures spouses against their partner’s risks, but
creates asymmetries in social insurance’s generosity for couples and singles.
I simulate changes to the generosity and design of this means-testing, to quantify
the value of this additional insurance. I first eliminate both exemptions (hD,t = xD,t =
0) that apply to couples with LTC expenditures and, second, eliminate the financial
asset exemption (xD,t = 0). I compare the resulting changes in government spending
to the changes in retiree welfare. To measure the costs associated with these reforms
I compute the present discounted value (PDV) of changes to the government budget
constraint including implicit changes covered by disregarded assets and differences in
taxes paid. Welfare changes are measured by compensating variation (CV) defined
as an immediate cash-on-hand payment leaving retirees indifferent to the reform.
This approach makes three assumption. First, I assume it costs the government
£1 to provide £1 of payments29 and compare the compensating variation with the
actuarial value of the alternative policy. Second, reforms are not revenue neutral.
The cost of providing both exemptions exceeds the cost of providing only one. For
comparison, I compute the value per £1 of government spending as the ratio of costs
to compensating variation. A ratio above 1 implies that eliminating the program and
28

In Medicaid, a US program with many similarities, houses are deemed countable assets while
homes are excluded. A house qualifies as a home if a community spouse or dependent relative resides
there or a nursing home stay is deemed temporary with intent to return. In practice, the homestead
exemption applies to many singles - a third of single medicaid recipients own homes (Achou, 2020).
29
This rules out other methods to make transfers more or less attractive to potential claimants.
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∆ PDV of payments
Total Transfers Disregard
All Initial Owners -9131
33
-5533
Top PI quartile
-9632
-75
-3948
2nd PI quartile
-9081
69
-5936
Bottom 50% PI
-8688
104
-6674

Compensating
Variation
59599
62261
61006
55464

Ratio:
-CV/∆PDV
6.53
6.46
6.72
6.38

Note: Columns (1)-(3): £increase in the PDV of government costs as of age 68. Column (4):
£transfer needed to compensate retirees for the reform. Column (5): Ratio column 4/column 1

Table 9: The Costs and Benefits of Eliminating All Exemptions for Couples
lump sum redistributing proceeds to retirees would be welfare decreasing. Third, I
assume reforms are unanticipated, ruling out changes to portfolio composition, saving
or marriage markets over the working life and measures the effect of a reform on
current retirees. I simulate changes for the same cohort as in Section 7 selecting a
subsample who are in couples and who own their own home at 68.
Specifically, compensating variation is computed at age 68 (the initial age in simulation) and defined as χ68 = χi68 (f68 , I, m68 , h68 , x68 , ph ) solving
V68i (f68 , I, m68 , h68 , x68 , ph ) = V68i (f68 , I, m68 , h68 , x68 + χ68 , ph |Ref orm),

(22)

with V68i (·) the age 68 value function computed for a given set of state variables.
This forward looking ex-ante measure incorporates both mechanical effects and the
behavioural responses to the reform and I report results for group averages.
Table 9 presents results from eliminating both exemptions for couples. The PDV
of total payments is reported in the first column. Columns 2 and 3 separate this
into direct transfers and implicit payments through disregarded assets.30 Column 1
shows that on average there is a large reduction in the cost born by the government.
Pooling together all married homeowners in the first row, the average reduction is
over £9,000. While the reduction in payments comes from a decrease in disregards,
this is partly offset by an increase in transfers because retirees now deplete their
private resources and qualify for direct transfers (columns 2 and 3). Splitting results
for initial owners along the PI dimension reveals modest heterogeneity in the size of
the implicit transfer from exempting assets, however, the likelihood of receiving direct
30

Columns 2 and 3 do not sum to the value in Column 1 because of changes in revenue collected
from housing transaction taxes, income taxes and estate tax.
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∆ PDV of payments
Total Transfers Disregard
All Initial Owners -3431
185
-2907
Top PI quartile
-3797
48
-2527
2nd PI quartile
-3319
224
-3096
Bottom 50% PI
-3187
279
-3082

Compensating
Variation
17020
22761
12521
16118

Ratio:
-CV/∆PDV
4.96
5.99
3.77
5.06

Note: Columns (1)-(3): £increase in the PDV of government costs as of age 68. Column (4):
£transfer needed to compensate retirees for the reform. Column (5): Ratio column 4/column 1

Table 10: The Costs and Benefits of Eliminating Financial Asset Exemptions
transfers by exhausting financial resources after the exemption is decreasing in PI.
Column 4 presents the compensating variation and column 5 presents the ratio of
this to the change in payments. This form of implicit insurance has both an income
effect and targets insurance at states of the world with high marginal utility. Those
with the highest consumption experience the largest drops when exposed to potentially catastrophic LTC expenses. This reform increases their exposure to the risk
of high medical expenses associated with their spouse and increases the probability
they rely on their housing wealth to finance future consumption or, even worse, see
their whole portfolio spent on a spouse’s care. Consequently, the baseline policy offers substantially more insurance for their total wealth and households require large
compensation to be indifferent to the reform. The per £1 valuation is larger than
results for medicaid expansion found in De Nardi et al. (2016a) or Achou (2020) for
samples of single US retirees. These studies, however, show a strong gradient in PI
and the sample of married homeowners studied here have much larger wealth holdings
on average. Furthermore, as highlighted by De Nardi et al. (2021), saving to insure
surviving spouses are responsible for almost 30% of all US retiree wealth holdings consistent with the large valuation of this policy. The valuations of this complete
insurance are large in part because it almost fully indemnifies couples.31
Table 10 eliminates the exemption on couples’ financial assets. This reform lowers the out-of-pocket share for LTC expenditures, as households are partially insured
against potentially catastrophic costs. On average, the government expenditure declines by less than 40% of the full policy. Household valuations, column 4, fall by
31

LTC expenditures are exogenous, consistent with evidence on their income and price elasticities.
This may lead to quantitatively larger welfare effects, but is unlikely to affect the qualitative findings.
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Figure 8: Effect of Liquid Wealth Exemption by Exemption Size
Panel (a): the CV and change in PDV of government expenditures (analogous to columns 1 and 4
in Table 10). Panel (b): The ratio (analogous to column (5) in Table 10). Both panels vary the
percentage exemption applied to Couples when one member of the household has LTC needs.

more than the change in expenses per initial owner and the per £1 valuation falls.
Both of these reforms consider inframarginal reductions in household insurance.
Figure 8 shows how valuations for exemptions to household financial wealth vary
with the size of the exemption and sign of the policy change. Per £1 valuations are
decreasing in the size of the exemption offered. The additional value of offering some
insurance far outweighs the limited cost this imposes on the government, but increasing insurance from the already generous status quo is less valuable. In addition, as
it approaches full indemnity the moral hazard effect substantially increases government costs. This is because eliminating risk completely leads to greater distortions
of household portfolios as they reduce liquid wealth holdings.
Why are the valuations for marginal liquidity large? Consider married retirees
Kate and Will. They own a home, liquid savings of £50,000 and must finance his
LTC expenditures. The existing policy caps Will’s LTC costs at £25,000. Kate has
£25,000, the house and a reduced pension income after Will dies.
Without any exemptions on financial assets, Will’s LTC costs eliminate all liquid
resources. Kate can keep their home and absorb the LTC expenses into non-housing
consumption, but reduces future consumption and enjoys a severe decline in consumption today. Alternatively, she can sell her home, pay large adjustment costs, economize on housing services and bequests, but release liquid wealth for consumption. As
discussed by Chetty and Szeidl (2007) and Kaplan and Violante (2014), households
39

may not find it optimal to adjust their housing stock in response to ‘small’ shocks.
Non-adjusters exhibit excess sensitivity in their non-housing consumption, magnifying the welfare costs of shocks. Providing exemptions for liquid wealth creates a buffer
which helps Kate avoid this dilemma and the large costs associated with it. Crucially,
insuring only her housing wealth is not enough to allow her to remain in the house.
Complementarity between housing and precautionary motives amplifies retirees’ valuation of liquidity because selling homes is costly. Increasing the generosity of the
policy leaves Kate better off as it provides additional liquidity, but, importantly, is
no longer providing the marginal liquidity to stay in their home.

9

Conclusion

This paper estimates a dynamic microeconomic model of consumption and housing
choices during old age in the presence of health, LTC expense, mortality and house
price risk. Combining data on wealth composition with tax policy changes in the
UK facilitates separately identifying different motives for holding wealth. Estimation
disciplined by data on future bequests reveals large differences in retirees’ preference
for leaving bequests which is correlated with lifetime income and wealth.
Understanding the portfolio composition of retirees and how they trade-off liquidity and housing is key with model validation reproducing causal evidence from notches
in the housing transaction tax schedule. Demand for liquidity drives differences in
the response to windfalls in retirement wealth. When house prices increase downsizing becomes more attractive whereas pension windfalls lower the attractiveness of
downsizing. This leads to differences among marginal downsizers; generating a lower
aggregate marginal propensity to bequeath from house price shocks, even though in
both cases older generations share their good fortune with future generations.
Finally, I address how means-testing in the provision of LTC benefits treats different asset classes. I concentrate on a feature of publicly provided LTC benefits which
confers additional insurance to the assets of couples. When the elderly want to remain
in their home the value of this insurance is important. Insuring only housing assets
is often insufficient to allow a healthy spouse to remain in the home. Thus, insuring
marginal liquid wealth is most valuable and designing means-testing with portfolios
in mind is a fruitful avenue for future work.
This paper leverages features of the UK institutional context to identify and quan40

tify savings motives. The results offer important lessons for the well being of retirees
and the design of public programs around the world. With rising house prices and
ageing populations it is essential to understand housing’s role in old age.
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Appendix For Online Publication
A

Inferring Permanent Income

I infer household level measures of permanent income that is invariant to the household structure so that it is fixed across demographic transitions. Individual non-labour
income is the sum of state pension income, private pension income, annuity income,
war pensions, widows pensions and any other declared non-labour income. It excludes
employment, self-employment income and asset returns. Other than state pensions
it does not include benefit income (which are part of the tax function in the model).
For singles income is the same as individual income and for couples it is the sum
across husband and wife. Following De Nardi et al. (2021), I assume log household
income for household i at age j follows:
ln yi,j = f (j, fit ) + h(Ii ) + ei,j

(A.1)

where f (·) is a flexible function of age and family structure and Ii is their time
invariant permanent income (PI). In practice I estimate the following fixed effect
regression to obtain consistent estimates of f (·):
ln yi,j = f (j, fit ) + γi + ei,j

(A.2)

For each household the estimated vector of coefficients is used to compute the
mean residual (or the estimate of their fixed effect) γ̂i which is consistent as the
number of periods a household is observed becomes large. Iˆi is computed as the
percentile rank of γ̂i . The final step is to estimate:
ln yi,j − f (j, fit ) = h(Ii ) + ei,j ,

(A.3)

which recovers the mapping from the PI index to the log of household income. In
practice, I use a third order polynomial in age j, dummies for family structure and
interactions with a linear trend in age to estimate f (·). h(·) is a fifth order polynomial
in estimated PI Iˆi .
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Figure A.1: Total Wealth by Cohort (Initial Owners)
Each line shows a cohort-PI cell over the period 2002-2014, plotted against average cohort ages.
Thicker lines denote higher PI groups.

B

Additional Key Facts

Figure A.1 displays average total wealth for the cohorts presented in the main text
(Panel a) and the remaining birth cohorts (Panel b). As with the discussion of
housing wealth in the main text and below, there is evidence of a common aggregate
trend. This leads to increasing wealth in the early waves and slowly declining wealth
thereafter for all PI groups. As discussed elsewhere, this is driven by the cyclicality
of housing wealth. Liquid wealth does not display the same cyclicality. As gaps in
both types of wealth accumulate, total wealth shows the largest PI gradient with
substantial heterogeneity along PI dimensions. This PI heterogeneity is larger than
the effect of within cohort ageing (with the exception of the youngest cohort in panel
b which are discussed below).

B.1

Housing Wealth

Figure A.2 reproduces Figure A.2 in the main text for the remaining birth cohorts.
Although the key facts remain when considering alternative cohorts, housing wealth
in panel (a) shows two apparent differences. First, the housing wealth of the highest
PI households appears more volatile. Second, the youngest cohort do not at first
glance appear to follow the same aggregate trend. However, this cohort ages into the
sample fours years later at the peak of UK houseprices.
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Figure A.2: Saving in Housing Wealth by Cohort (Initial Owners, Additional Cohorts)
Panel (a): Each line shows a cohort-PI cell over the period 2002-2014, plotted against average cohort
ages. Thicker lines denote higher PI groups. Panel (b): cohort cells for the same period.

B.2

Liquid Wealth

Figure A.3 displays average liquid wealth for the alternative cohorts. As with the
cohorts in the main text, there is some evidence of deaccumulation among initial
owners and differences between the top PI quartile and the 2nd group exceed differences between the 2nd quartile and bottom 50% of the PI distribution. There are
signs of accumulation by initial owners, but this is small in absolute terms.

C

Policy details

Table A.1 documents the thresholds and rates for SDLT throughout the sample period. The final column indicates how different tax policies are implemented in the
model. Due to the two year time period in the model (to match the ELSA data), and
to keep estimation computationally feasible, I pool the March 2005 reform with the
March 2006 reform. The “Stamp Duty Holiday” was originally scheduled to end in
September 2009 before being extended in April of that year. I treat this April extension and eventual reversal as known ex-ante. One important feature of the variation in
SDLT over the time period is that it effects households across the wealth distribution
with reforms at both the upper and lower ends of the housing wealth distribution.
Households elsewhere in the distribution also interact with this tax system as price
fluctuations move them across thresholds.
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Threshold (£1,000s) by Rate
Effective from
28 March 2000
17 March 2005
23 March 2006
03 September 2008a
01 January 2010
06 April 2011

1%
£60
£120
£125
£175
£125
£125

3%
£250
£250
£250
£250
£250
£250

4%
£500
£500
£500
£500
£500
£500

5%
N/a
N/a
N/a
N/a
N/a
£1,000

7%
N/a
N/a
N/a
N/a
N/a
£2,000

Regime
I
II
II
III
IV
V

Table A.1: Rates and Thresholds for Stamp Duty Land Tax
All thresholds and rates refer to transactions of residential property . During the time period there
are additional exemptions for disadvantaged areas. a denotes the “Stamp Duty Holiday” where the
0% rate threshold was temporarily extended.

4

The reform to Estate Taxation, which was backdated indefinitely, described in
Section 3 came with little warning.1 Consequently, I assume no anticipation. Model
regimes I-II use the original tax treatment while III-V use the new threshold. Strictly,
the reform depends on bequests disbursed at death of the first partner. However, to
avoid introducing additional state variables (and consistent with the model) I assume
this doubles the effective threshold at death of the final spouse. This in line with the
effective change to the policy for the majority of older households in ELSA. Crawford
and Mei (2018) report that nearly all wealth is left to a surviving partner, if one
exists, alleviating the impact of incomplete histories. Typically, the never-married or
divorced retirees have lower savings and the original threshold is non-binding. Thus,
this simplification introduces minimal error in tax incentives. Figure A.1, shows the
mean wealth holdings in the top 50% of the PI distribution are near or above the
original exemption rate, suggesting the reform is empirically relevant.

D

Additional RDD results

A key concern in RDD estimation is the manipulation of the forcing variable. Conventional tests for manipulation (McCrary, 2008) overreject when the forcing variable
is discrete. Figure A.4a plots the distribution of self assessed house values and shows
that their support has a number of mass points. Mass points are not themselves
evidence of manipulation and there is no evidence of missing mass to the right of
the threshold - missing mass here would be consistent with manipulating self assessed
house values reported to ELSA.2 Furthermore, the distribution around the transaction
tax threshold is similar to other windows.
Nevertheless, a concern is that the sparsity of the underlying distribution may
lead to bias in statistical inference. Figure A.4b shows the results from placebo
tests applying the same estimation to artificial thresholds evenly spaced at £10,000
1

The BBC described events as:
Chancellor Alistair Darling has doubled the inheritance tax threshold for married...But
he was accused by the Tories - who unveiled policies in all these areas last week - of
being in a “panic” after their recent opinion poll surge.
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7034399.stm
2
The distribution suggests households have a tendency to report round numbers - a form of nonclassical measurement error. Battistin et al. (2009) show that as long as non-classical measurement
error is orthogonal to the process of interest then the regression discontinuity design still identifies
the parameter of interest.
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Figure A.4: Transaction Taxes, House Values and Mobility - Additional Details
Panel (a): The distribution of self assessed house values for the sample population.The vertical
dashed red line indicates the transaction tax threshold. Panel (b): Placebo tests for alternative
artificial transaction tax thresholds using the quadratic specification described in the main text.

intervals. Only the coefficient using the true transaction tax threshold is significant
and sparsity does not generate false significance at placebo thresholds. Additional
results for confidence intervals with guaranteed coverage properties are below.
In addition to checking for manipulation, I directly test for the smooth distribution of additional covariates by estimating the main specification with alternative
covariates as the outcome variable. Table A.2 reports the treatment effect for four
variables that economic theory predicts affects household moving decisions. The first
two columns show there is no statistically significant discontinuity in total (or liquid)
resources around this threshold. Likewise column 3 shows age varies smoothly across
the transaction tax threshold. The final column shows there is a small, statistically
Total Wealth
(100,000s GBP)
-0.0568
(0.0868)

Liquid Wealth
(100,000s GBP)
-0.0568
(0.0868)

Age
Permanent Income
(Years)
(0 to 1)
0.0382
-0.0411∗∗
(0.458)
(0.0191)

All regressions use a second order polynomial in housing wealth and additionally control for wave
fixed effects, household demographics, and region dummies. Standard Errors are clustered by
household. N=3979 throughout. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.5, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Table A.2: Covariate Balance around Transaction Tax Thresholds
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significant reduction in household PI which falls by 4 percentage points. Those to
the left of the threshold have an average PI rank at the 60th percentile. While it is
unlikely that such a small decline generates the behaviour of interest (the sign of the
effect predicted by economic theory is ambiguous), I condition on PI throughout to
avoid this potential confounder.3
Table A.3 presents alternative specifications from the regression discontinuity estimation of the effect of transaction taxes on the mobility of older household described
in Section 3 as well alternative inference.

Order of polynomial
Parametric Common Slope
Linear

Cubic

Quartic

N

Smoothness (K)
Local Linear
BSD CI
Implied Bandwidth
Significance Level
Eff. Sample Size

10%
-0.0445∗∗
(0.0181)
-729.5
-0.0548∗
(0.0332)
-730.9
-0.0383
(0.0398)
-727.7
1224

Panel A: Higher Order Polynomials
Band around cuttoff
15%
20%
-0.0475∗∗∗
(0.0160)
-879.4
-0.0377
(0.0289)
-877.8
-0.0305
(0.0294)
-882.1
1559

-0.0207∗
(0.0114)
-2118
-0.0575∗∗∗
(0.0180)
-2124
-0.0519∗∗
(0.0207)
-2127
3023

25%

30%

-0.0200∗
(0.0116)
-2112
-0.0533∗∗∗
(0.0176)
-2118
-0.0549∗∗∗
(0.0180)
-2116
3233

-0.0250∗∗
(0.0110)
-2873
-0.0287∗∗
(0.0140)
-2871
-0.0293∗∗
(0.0148)
-2869
3979

Panel B: Bounded Second Derivative Inference
0.001
0.01
0.02
0.1
-0.0290
-0.0290
-0.0290
-0.0290
[-0.0571,-0.000892] [-0.0571,-0.000875] [-0.0572,-0.000826] [-0.0587,0.000694]
30%
30%
30%
30%
5%
5%
5%
5%
943
943
943
943

0.1
-0.0290
[-0.0539,-0.00405]
30%
10%
943

All regressions additionally control for wave fixed effects, a polynomial in age, household
demographics, a polynomial in permanent income and region dummies. Following Kolesár and
Rothe (2018), Standard Errors in panel A are clustered by household. The Akike Information
Criterion is shown in italics. In panel B the implied bandwidth is the one that minimizes the
length of the resulting CI for a given choice of K. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.5, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Table A.3: The Effect of Transaction Taxes on Household Mobility
Panel A shows the robustness of the common slope estimates to alternative order
polynomials. First, the linear specification is more sensitive to the size of the bandwith chosen than the specification in the main text. For the smallest band around
the cut-off value the result using a quadratic specification are of a similar magnitude
to the linear specification, but estimated with less precision. Using both the cubic
and quartic estimators the estimated treatment effect remains negative for all band3

The effect on estimated parameters of including this additional control is minimal.

7

widths and is significant for larger bandwidths around the discontinuity in the SDLT
schedule. The results are consistent with the lower order polynomial and local linear
estimates presented in the main text. Gelman and Imbens (2017) caution over using higher-order global polynomials due to noisy estimates, sensitivity to the degree
of the polynomial and poor coverage of confidence intervals. While the results here
demonstrate some of these problems, nevertheless the point estimates are similar to
those obtained with lower order polynomials and non-parametric methods (particularly over the largest estimation window). This suggests estimated treatment effects
are not driven by the approximation of the conditional expectation function.
House values have an underlying discrete support (Figure A.4a). In the baseline
analysis, tests of statistical significance use standard errors clustered at the household
level. As recommended by Kolesár and Rothe (2018) they are not clustered at values
in the support of the forcing variable (Lee and Card, 2008, motivates this adjustment). When resulting model misspecification bias is large these confidence intervals
undercover the true average treatment effect. This is especially concerning when
large bandwidths are used or the discrete support leads to insufficient observations in
a small neighbourhood of the threshold.
To assess the robustness of results to these concerns, Panel B in A.3 uses an alternative method (see Kolesár and Rothe, 2018) to construct confidence intervals with
guaranteed coverage properties. Implementing this method requires that a smoothness constant K (a bound on the second derivative of the conditional expectation
function with K = 0 indicating it is known to be linear) is chosen.
Column 1-5 report confidence intervals for K ∈ {0.001, 0.01, 0.02, 0.1}, representing a range of smoothness parameters ranging from ‘optimistic’ to ‘pessimistic’ choices
(central values sandwich a lower bound estimate K = 0.012). Each column reports
bias corrected point estimates using a local linear estimator with optimal bandwidth
for fixed smoothness constants and classes. Resulting confidence intervals are reasonably tight and are close to those reported in Table 2. The null hypothesis of 0 effect
is rejected at the 5% significance level for all but the most pessimistic value of K.
Even for this extreme case a 90% confidence interval excludes 0.4
4

Although this is not analogous to a one-sided test it is also the case that the null hypothesis of
a weakly positive treatment effect is rejected at the 5% significance level.
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E

(Un)Collateralized Borrowing by the Elderly

I rule out collateralized and uncollateralized borrowing for three reasons. First, 95% of
older households have paid off their mortgage or have positive liquid wealth balances.
Second, many retired households fail to meet the income requirements of traditional
forward mortgages and in the data very few retired households take out new mortgages
to upsize. Third, although reverse mortgage products do exist the UK market is
small - a common international trend. Finally, the UK market is tightly controlled
on negative equity where the total value of the mortgage is still required to be paid
in full which lowers the demand for equity release.
Davidoff et al. (2017) documents that limited financial literacy of potential product
users contributes to the low take up of reverse mortgages in the US. Two major
mortgage retailers offered home equity release products in the UK between 1996 and
1998 as shared appreciation schemes (where home owners are insured against falls in
house prices, but own progressively less of the equity in their home when prices rise).
These shared appreciation schemes were subject to limited financial regulation and
were the subsequent target of extensive negative press coverage and a class action
lawsuit. This likely persistently depresses demand for equity release products.

F

Renter’s Problem

The renter’s problem (h0 = 0), renting housing services h̃ at price rh ph , is:
n
i
Vji (Ω) = max{c,h̃,a0 } u(f, c, h̃) + +β · η(j, I, m, f )E[Vj+1
(Ω0 ) Ω, h0 = 0, a0 ]
o
+ β(1 − η(j, I, m, f ))E[φi (b) Ω, h0 = 0, a0 ] ,
(A.4)
subject to equations (2)-(9), (A.5)-(A.6), (14)-(17) and bequests constrained by equation (18). Renting housing services implies modified constraints:

xt+1 =xt − ct − rh ph,t h̃t − Q(0, ht , ph,t ) − mxt+1 + τy r at+1 + yt+1 , ft+1 , τ + trt+1
(A.5)
at+1 =xt − ct − rh h̃t ph,t − Q(0, ht , ph,t ) ≥ 0,

9

∀t.

(A.6)

G

Method of Simulated Moments

The estimated parameters are defined by minimizing the weighted distance between
data moments and model generated moments for a given parameter vector:
θ̂ arg min G(ϑ, θ)0 W G(ϑ, θ),
θ∈Θ

(A.7)

which takes the form of a standard GMM objective function. This differs from equation (20) as here moment conditions depend explicitly on both ϑ and θ the vectors
of first and second stage estimates respectively. W is the inverse-diagonal weighting
matrix proposed by Pischke (1995) as the asymptotically optimal weighting matrix
suffers from finite sample bias (Altonji and Segal, 1996).
The dynamic programming problem described in Section 4 does not admit closed
form analytic solutions and I use numerical methods described in Appendix K to compute optimal policies and simulate household decisions. This is a standard approach
(see, for example, Gourinchas and Parker, 2002). Given the optimal household decisions for a given set of parameter values and household initial conditions drawn from
the data, I simulate forward households through the different policy regimes drawing
values of mx from their distribution using Monte Carlo methods. I then construct
moment conditions from this simulated data in the exact same way as in the data this forms the basis of my estimation procedure.
To construct moment conditions, I calculate model implied ‘objective’ probabilities
as the equivalent of subjective probabilities in ELSA provided on a 101 point (0-100)
percentage scale. The question I match is
Including property and other valuables that you [and your husband/wife/
partner] might own, what are the chances that you [and your husband/wife/partner]
will leave an inheritance totalling £150,000 or more?
This assumes self-reported probabilities accurately summarize optimal future behaviour given a household’s current information set. This is common when expectations about future behaviour are used in combination with contemporaneous choice
data ( e.g. van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008; van der Klaauw, 2012).
Using conditional means as moment conditions requires the model matches the full
distribution of wealth holdings well because a household’s total wealth rank and PI
are positively correlated. I winsorize wealth moments in both data and simulations at
10

the 95th percentile. This mitigates the impact of the very wealthy and other potential
sources of measurement error. I use 7 five year birth cohorts and 3 PI groups. Data
versions of these moments are presented in Section 2 and I use identical operations
to calculate simulation equivalents.
I simulate 150,000 sample households and draw initial state variables from the
empirical joint distribution in the ELSA data. Simulated counterparts remain in
the simulation sample for the duration that their ELSA donor remains in the ELSA
sample and receive their donor’s sequence of exogenous state variables. This defines
a calendar time window including reforms to Inheritance Tax and transaction taxes
(SDLT) and house price changes experienced by their ELSA donor. This procedure
perfectly replicates any compositional changes in the sample as they age and die as
well as the sequence of time effects through aggregate house price changes and policy
reforms (including arbitrary realized correlation).
To summarize, I match mean liquid wealth, housing wealth, bequest probabilities,
mobility rates, and homeownership rates by birth cohort, age and conditional on PI
and initial ownership status. Matching moments by average age conditional on birth
cohort is equivalent to matching the ELSA data by wave. Let qi,t denote a data
quantity for household i at time t and q̄c,p,o,t (ϑ, θ) denote the model predicted average
quantity for simulated households in cohort c, PI group p, initial housing tenure o at
time t t. Moment conditions can then be expressed as:
E([qi,t − q̄c,p,o,t (ϑ, θ)] × 1[ci = c] × 1[Ii ∈ Pp ] × 1[oi = o] × 1[i observed at t]|t), (A.8)
for c ∈ {1910, 1915, 1920, 1925, 1930, 1935, 1940}, o ∈ {owner, renter}, p ∈ {1, 2, 3},
and t ∈ {2002, 2004, ..., 2014}. Pp defines the values contained in the pth PI group.
In addition, each cohort-income-ownership-age cell must have at least 15 observations
to be included in the GMM criterion. In total there are 410 target moments.
Let N denote independent households that are each observed at up to T separate
calendar years. G(ϑ, θ) denotes the J-element vector of moment conditions described
cN denote the
immediately above, and ĜN (ϑ, θ) denotes its sample analog. Letting W
J × J weighting matrix, computed as the inverse-diagonal of the sample analog5 to
5

cN .
I use the observations in each cell, Nc,p,o,t , instead of N to calculate diagonal elements of W
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the optimal asymptotic weighting matrix, the MSM estimator θ̂ is implemented as:
cN ĜN (ϑ, θ).
arg min ĜN (ϑ, θ)0 W
θ∈Θ

(A.9)

In practice, ϑ is also estimated, however, computational concerns necessitate treating
it as known throughout the analysis that follows. Under the regularity conditions
stated in Pakes and Pollard (1989) and Duffie and Singleton (1993), the MSM estimator θ̂ is both consistent and asymptotically normally distributed:
√



N θ̂ − θ0

N (0, V),

with the variance-covariance matrix V given by
V = (1 + τ )(D0 WD)−1 D0 WSWD(D0 WD)−1 ,
where S is the variance-covariance matrix of the data; τ is the ratio of the number of
observations to the number of simulated observations;
D=

∂G(ϑ, θ)
∂θ0

(A.10)
θ=θ0

c N }.
is the J×M gradient matrix of the population moment vector; and W = plimN →∞ {W
D, S, and W are estimated by their sample analogs. When estimating S, I use sample
statistics, replacing q̄c,p,o,t (ϑ, θ) by the sample mean for group c, p, o, t.

H

Additional Estimation Details

This appendix summarizes first stage parameter estimates or calibrations not in the
main text as well as providing more detail on how health and mortality are estimated.
Table A.4 summarizes data sources and first stage parameter values.
The Utility Function The consumption equivalence scale is set using the OECD
modified scale (estimates for retirees in De Nardi et al., 2021, are almost identical).
The Housing Market Annual depreciation, δ, is set at 2% (Cocco and Lopes,
2020) and the rental cost is 3.94% of the sale price (Jordà et al., 2019). I estimate the
12

Parameter
αn
δ
rh
ρh
µh
σh
κ
r
y(·)
τy
cmin
η(·)
P r(mgj+1 |·)
µmx (·)
σmx (·)

Description
Value
Consumption Equivalence Scale
1.5
Housing Maintenance Costs
0.02
Rental Cost
3.94%
House Price AR(1) persistence
0.977
House Price Drift
0.019
House Price S.D. Innovations
0.095
Incidence of SDLT on Seller
0.4
Risk Free Return
3.0%
Deterministic Income Profile
Income Tax Function
Table A.5
LTC consumption floor (Singles)
£2,679
Survival Probabilities
Health status
Mean LTC Expenses
Conditional variance LTC Expenses

Source
OECD Modified Scale
Cocco and Lopes (2020)
Jordà et al. (2019)
HM Land Registry
HM Land Registry
HM Land Registry
Besley et al. (2014)
Bozio et al. (2017)
ELSA
TAXBEN
Ameriks et al. (2011)
ELSA
ELSA
HRS
HRS

All values are annual and expressed in 2014 prices.

Table A.4: 1st Stage Parameter Estimates
time series process for house prices using OLS and data from the HM Land Registry
UK house price index series. The estimation sample uses data from all regions in
England and normalizes December 2002 house prices to 1. House prices are highly
persistent, drift upwards, and innovations with a large variance. Parameter values
are in table A.4. Transaction tax incidence is taken from Besley et al. (2014).
The Budget Constraint I calibrate returns on the risk free asset, r, at 3% (Bozio
et al., 2017). Non-asset pension income profiles are estimated directly from ELSA
using the procedure described in Appendix A. Income taxes are approximated by a
modified version of a common log-linear functional form (e.g. Feldstein, 1969) with
after tax income given by
ỹ = ȳ + λy y 1−τy ,
where λy controls the level of taxation, τy controls progressivity and ȳ captures features corresponding to an income floor. I estimate this separately for couples and
singles. I combine data from TAXBEN, a microsimulation model of the UK tax and
benefit system (see Waters, 2017, for further details), with individual household data
for my ELSA sample in order to estimate the tax function. This includes taxes and
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ȳ
λy
Singles
556
99.1
(737) (24.8)
Couples 5,083 7.62
(819) (2.32)

τy
R2
0.468
0.90
(.0213)
0.213
0.927
(0.0262)

Table A.5: Tax Function Parameter Estimates
both means-tested and universal benefits, but excludes coverage of social care costs.6
Table A.5 reports parameters estimated by non-linear least squares. Despite its
parsimony, R2 values show this accurately predicts after tax and transfer income.
Mortality and Health Transitions I define the worst health status as difficulties
with two or more Activities of Daily Living (ADL) capturing both mortality and medical expenditure effects in a parsimonious manner. Each wave, household members
are asked about difficulties in six different categories of activities:
1. difficulty dressing, including putting on shoes and socks
2. difficulty walking across a room
3. difficulty bathing or showering
4. difficulty eating, such as cutting up food
5. difficulty getting in and out of bed
6. difficulty using the toilet, including getting up or down
This is intended to capture the minimum range of daily activities typically performed by the adult population and proxy an individual’s ability to live independently.
Each individual’s health status, mg , has four possible values enumerated as follows:

m=




0




1


2




3

6

Good Health
Bad Health

,

ADL Limitations
Dead

This is not included in the tax function as its means-testing is explicitly modeled.
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(A.11)

with transition probabilities depending on current health, age j, family structure f ,
PI I, and gender g.7 Elements of the health transition matrix are given by


πi,q,p (j, fit , Ii , g = Pr mgm,j+2 = q mgi,j = p; j, fi,t , Ii , g ,

(A.12)

where transitions span the two year interval of the ELSA data. These transition probabilities are estimated by fitting a multinomial logit model to observed transitions.
This gives the following expression for health and mortality transitions

exit βq
,
πi,q,p (j, fit , Ii , g = P3
xit βh
h=0 e

(A.13)

where βq denotes the coefficient vector for next period outcome q. Health transitions
and survival probabilities are jointly estimated at the individual level using a maximum likelihood estimator. The vector of covariates xit includes age, sex, current
health status, marital status, and PI. Specifically, a third order age polynomial, indicators for gender and marital status (interacted with a linear age trend), an indicator
for single man interacted with PI, contemporaneous indicators for health (interacted
with age, gender and PI), and a quadratic in PI (interacted with a linear age trend
and marital status). In total this gives 25 parameters in each βq coefficient vector.
Table 3 summarizes simulated histories using estimated transition probabilities.
Long Term Care Costs Due to the paucity of UK data I use comparable data from
the HRS to estimate the LTC expense process - effectively imputation. I construct
the HRS data identically to the ELSA data to replicate sample selection.
The HRS medical spending measure is the sum of expenditures paid out-of-pocket
plus those paid by Medicaid (See De Nardi et al., 2021, for details on this construction)
capturing total costs incurred by private individuals and the government. This is the
relevant measure as the model incorporates means-tested government payments that
would be covered by Medicaid in the US. This measure is backwards looking, hence
mxj captures the flow of LTC expenses between j − 1 and j. Equations (7) and (??)
outline this process. I estimate µmx (·) and σmx (·), by writing Equation (7) as
ln mxit = x1i β1 + x2it β2 + ϑi + ςit ,
7

(A.14)

Health transitions are independent of medical spending. Empirical evidence on whether medical
spending improves health at older ages is inconclusive in part due to reverse causality.
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where x1i denotes a vector of time-invariant variables, x2it denotes a vector of timevarying variables, ϑi is an unobserved person-specific term, and ςit captures any remaining variation. I assume E(ςit | ϑi ) = 0.
I estimate Equation (A.14) in three steps. First, regressing log medical spending
on the time-varying factors in Equation (A.14), namely age, household structure,
and health, and interaction terms (such as gender and PI interacted with the time
varying variables) using a fixed effects estimator. Specifically, I regress log medical
spending on an age quadratic (the linear trend interacted with PI), indicators for
single man and single woman (interacted with an age trend), the contemporaneous
and lagged values of indicators for health status, whether the man died (interacted
with PI), whether the woman died (interacted with PI). Including current and lagged
family structure indicators accounts for the jump in medical spending at the death
of a family member and including health indicators for both periods distinguishes
persistent from transitory health episodes.
As fixed effects regression cannot identify the effects of time-invariant factors,
which are subsumed into the estimated fixed effects, the second step collects the
residuals from the first regression, including estimated fixed effects, and regresses
them on the time-invariant factors: a quadratic in PI and a set of cohort dummies.
A key feature of this spending model is that both the conditional variance and the
conditional mean of medical spending depends on demographic and socioeconomic
factors, through the function σ(·). The third step uses estimates µ̂mx (·) to back out
2 (·), residuals are squared and regressed
the residual  from Equation (7). To find σ[
on the demographic and socioeconomic variables in Equation (7).
When including this estimated process in the model, I impose 0 costs unless a
member of the household is in the ADL state. I do not impose this in estimation, using information about the relationship between demographic and socieconomic characterstics and medical spending in all health states of the HRS to ameliorate limited
sample size across age, PI, and family structure cells in the ADL state.
Latent Types I recover the bequest preference index by estimating:
liquid
housing
yi,t = βXi,t + f (Wi,t
, Wi,t
) + λt + γi + ui,t
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(A.15)

where the dependent variable is their subjective bequest probability and I control
for total wealth by allowing for within wave quintile specific effects. Quintile specific
effects impose limited restrictions on the underlying function and I control separately
for home ownership and the housing wealth share. I control for contemporaneous
characteristics of the household with time t period controls for age, household income, gender, marital status, health for all household members, subjective survival
probabilities, and vital statistics of their parents as well as wave fixed effects.8 Finally,
the object of interest is a household specific fixed effect γi . Additionally, I rezidualize
on time invariant PI and birth cohort dummies.
I place no direct interpretation on the coefficients or fixed effects recovered by this
regression, instead viewing it as a statistical exercise designed to capture systematic
differences across households. Estimated fixed effects, γ̂i , are noisy measures, but
potentially informative of future behaviour. This is similar to using heterogeneity
in stated intention to save for a bequest (see Laitner and Juster, 1996) or reason
for saving (Favilukis et al., 2017, use the Survey of Consumer Finances to calibrate
binary bequest motive heterogeneity generating wealth inequality).
Marginal distributions of household characteristics, zi , by household types are
displayed in figures A.5a to A.5c with mean values denoted by dashed vertical line.
This provides a succinct description of how the k-means clustering algorithm partitions household’s based on their characteristics. These results offer a more complete
characterisation than the summary statistics provided in Table 4. The full distributions reflect the comparisons of group means. However, as clustering uses multiple
dimensions the supports in any given dimension are not exclusive.
When using the k-means clustering approach, the researcher is left with two degrees of freedom: a) which variables to use to cluster the households and b) the
number of clusters.9 The choice of variables to cluster on is motivated by the economic problem agents face and is discussed in more detail in Section 6 and I choose
the number of clusters following heuristic methods in machine learning. Indexing the
problem by a given number of clusters K:
min

KK ,{z̄k }K
k=1

SSEK

where z̄k =

1 X
zi ,
Nk

KK = {k(i)}ni=1

(A.16)

k(i)=k

8

Wave specific effects are necessary because survey questions refer to a fixed nominal threshold.
It is also necessary to specify cluster initialization, however, I use a multi-start algorithm where
the initial assignment of clusters across households is drawn from 10,000 random seeds.
9
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Figure A.5: Additional Clustering details

18

the optimal number of clusters K minimises this objective function without ‘overfitting’. As within cluster dissimilarity (the Sum of Squared Errors) is decreasing in the
number of clusters K, which precludes cross-validation techniques, heuristics use the
following intuition: suppose there is a true number of clusters K ∗ . For K < K ∗ the
algorithm assigns a subset of the true groups to each cluster. Increasing the number
of clusters allows the algorithm to assign groups in a subset to a new cluster. Then
increasing the number of clusters if K < K ∗ leads to a large decrease in the measure
of within cluster dissimilarity. In contrast, when K > K ∗ one of the clusters partitions a true group into two spurious clusters. Consequently, the decrease in within
cluster dissimilarity must be smaller.
Figure A.5d plots the Sum of Squared Errors (SSEK ) against the number of
clusters a commonly used heuristic method for identifying this kink point: the ‘Elbow
statistic’. Visual inspection identifies a kink at K = 4, which partitions the data into
transparent groups while maintaining computational tractability.

I

Computing the Bequest Share

To simplify discussion, I present bequest allocations when a household faces certain
death in the following period. To do so, I compute the solution to the following static
allocation problem for a single retiree renting housing:
max u(f, c, s) + βφ(b) s.t. c + s + b = x
c,s

(A.17)

I solve the problem expressed in terms of expenditures, e, under unit house prices
and abstract from LTC costs. The indirect utility function is given by:

1−γ

e1−γ
e1−γ
σ 1 − σ 1−σ
× σ
=
× ū,
u (e) =
1−γ
rh
1−γ
e

(A.18)

and the allocation between within period expenditures and bequests solves:
max ue (e) + βφ(x − e)
e≤x

(A.19)

The solution to this problem characterises the marginal propensity to bequeath and
the threshold level of consumption above which bequests are operative. Interior so-

19

lutions have the following expression for the marginal propensity to expend:
MP E =

φ̄
1 + φ̄

where φ̄ =

βφ1 − γ1
,
ū

(A.20)

and the threshold value of final period wealth above which bequest motives become
operative (or the annuity value of consumption) is given by:
cbeq = φ̄ × φ2 .

(A.21)

Finally, Figure 5 requires homogenizing estimates across studies. Only Nakajima
and Telyukova (2020) estimate a model with housing. For the remaining studies I use
this paper’s estimated σ to calculate ū while using their own estimate of the coefficient
of relative risk aversion, γ. This generates minor differences between reported MPCs
and the MPE. Lastly, I adjust for a 2014 price level.

J

Additional Model Fit

Figures 6 - A.11 display the corresponding data and simulated moments for additional
target moments, including the remaining four birth cohorts.
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Figure A.6: Model Fit - Mobility (Initial Owners, ELSA Data & Simulations)
Solid lines: cohorts aged 64-68, 74-78 and 84-88 in 2002. Dashed lines: model simulations.

Figure A.6 highlights that the model replicates moving house and tenure decisions.
The left panel shows the model captures the infrequent decision to move house, en20
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dogenously generating illiquidity in housing. Similarly, the right panel shows the
model is able to broadly capture the observed rates of homeownership. If anything,
it slightly understates the increase in transitions to renting occurring with age.
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Figure A.7: Model Fit - Bequest Probabilities (ELSA Data & Simulations)
Solid lines: cohorts aged 64-68, 74-78 and 84-88 in 2002. Dashed lines: model simulations.

Figure A.7 shows the model dispersion in expected bequests matches the data.
The left panel shows that for initial owners it varies with age, PI and cohort - capturing
salient heterogeneity in the data. Comparing to the right panel shows that the model
captures large differences in expected bequests by initial housing tenure.
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Figure A.8: Model Fit - Liquid Wealth (Initial Renters, ELSA Data & Simulations)
Panel (a): Solid lines: cohorts aged 64-68, 74-78 and 84-88 in 2002. Panel (b): Solid lines: cohorts
aged 59-63, 69-73 and 79-83 in 2002. Dashed lines: model simulations.
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Liquid Wealth £100,000s

Housing Wealth £100,000s

Figure A.8 shows the model replicates the limited liquid wealth holdings and lack
of wealth accumulation for initial renters. The right panel shows the same simulated and data moments for the additional birth cohorts presented in Appendix B.
Figures A.9-A.11 produce simulated and data moments for these additional cohorts,
showing the model’s ability to match key patterns and heterogeneity extends to these
additional cohorts.
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Figure A.9: Model Fit - Wealth (Initial Owners, ELSA Data & Simulations)
Solid lines: cohorts aged 59-63, 69-73 and 79-83 in 2002. Dashed lines: model simulations.
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Figure A.10: Model Fit - Mobility (Initial Owners, ELSA Data & Simulations)
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Supplemental Materials (not for publication):
Numerical Procedure

This appendix discusses the implementation of each of these procedures in more
detail. I solve the model using backwards induction. At each age I compute the
optimal savings, housing and consumption decision for all possible combinations of
the state variables. I use the policy functions to compute the value function and
iterate backwards.
Discretization The model has four discrete state variables: age, health status,
family structure and idiosyncratic bequest motive. There are four additional state
variables that must be discretized: PI, housing, cash-on-hand, and the aggregate
house price level as well as the additional transitory medical expense shock. PI
is placed on an unequally spaced grid with 6 elements, where the grid points are
concentrated towards the extremes of the distribution. Discretizeing tax policy is
described in Appendix C.
Housing, which is both a state and a choice variable, is discretized1 using a single
point to denote current renters and 14 additional points for homeowners - the first 12
points of this grid are placed at the median of the 12 quantiles of the 2002 housing
wealth distribution of my ELSA sample (conditional on being below £1,250,000 which
covers over 99% of homeowners in the sample) with two additional points placed at
£1,250,000 and £2,500,000.
To avoid spurious discontinuities arising from this approximation choice I use a
finer grid to simulate the Regression Discontinuity results reported in Table 6. I use
31 possible housing choices and increase the number of points in the region of the tax
discontinuity.
Cash-on-hand is placed on a grid with 82 points placed on an exponential scale.
I use a small number of cash-on-hand points for the available resource because the
solution method (described below) involves calculating an exact solution to the Euler
Equation at each point. The log of the aggregate house price level is placed on a grid
with 8 elements and the transitory component of medical expenses is placed on a grid
1

Numerous notches in the transaction tax mean that the budget set is non-convex. This necessitates the practical choice to discretize both state variable and housing choice.

1

with 3 elements.2 Both use the method of Tauchen (1986).
Consumption and next period liquid wealth are not placed on a grid. Instead, individuals can choose any feasible level of consumption and next period liquid wealth.
In total, the value function and policy functions are calculated for 3,542,400 combinations of state variables for each age and policy regime.
Computing the Solution to the Household’s Problem In order to tractably
solve this problem while maintaining a high level of accuracy I model the choice of
housing as a discrete choice and follow the modified version of the endogenous gridpoint method (EGM) algorithm for discrete continuous dynamic choice models in
Iskhakov et al. (2017).3 This variation on the EGM algorithm (Carroll, 2006) uses
discrete choice (housing) conditional euler equations to find conditional consumption
and savings policies.
The continuation value of the model studied in this paper is not globally concave
due to the presence of the consumption floor and the discrete housing decision which
introduce kinks in the value function.4 Consequently, the optimal policies delivered
by the EGM step do not necessarily correspond to the optimal policies of the model.
In order to ensure that the globally optimum consumption value is selected from the
multiple solutions to the Euler Equation, due to the presence of nonconvexities, I
construct the (housing choice specific) upper envelope over segments of the (housing
choice specific) value function in regions of the endogenous cash-on-hand grid where
multiple solutions are detected. This procedure follows the method described in
Iskhakov et al. (2017). For saving below the consumption floor, the marginal utility
of saving is 0 and I follow Hubbard et al. (1995) in replacing the consumption floor
with an indicator function in the Euler equation.
Unconditional policy and value functions are recovered by taking the maximum
over each discrete choice. In this paper, cash-on-hand is not deterministic and I adapt
their method by controlling for household savings (the deterministic component of
cash-on-hand) as the end of period state variable.
The DC-EGM method specifies a grid for the post-decision savings state and
2

Results with 3 or 5 points for the transitory shock are indistinguishable
Fella (2014) also proposes an EGM algorithm for non-smooth non-convex problems
4
Typically kinks which occur due to next period non-concavities are referred to as primary kinks
while kinks that perpetuate backwards from future period non-concavities are referred to as secondary kinks. The presence of further uncertainty in future periods helps to smooth out some of
the secondary kinks, but the approach used here accounts for both types of kinks.
3

2

returns the housing choice-specific optimal policies and value functions on an endogenous grid. Consequently, an extra step is needed before it is possible to compare the
payoff associated with different housing choices for at initial cash-on-hand - the upper envelope calculation. I refer to this step as regularization and interpolate each of
the housing choice-specific value functions and policy functions onto a pre-specified
exogenous cash-on-hand grid that is common across housing choices. In the regularization step, when interpolating the value function for households who choose to
locate at the borrowing constraint for the next period I use the analytic solution for
their value function (given the computed expected value function associated with the
borrowing constraint) next period.
Optimal Policy in Simulation Simulated households do not have to live on the
discrete points of the cash-on-hand space where housing choices are determined. Consequently, in the simulations I compute optimal choices assessing each housing choice
and allowing simulated households to consume equally spaced proportions of their
cash-on-hand (after housing adjustment) on a 501 point grid.
Minimising the GMM Criterion The GMM criterion function may have multiple local minima. SMM estimates are typically found by employing multi-start
derivative free algorithms. I proceed in two steps.
First, I evaluate the objective function at 3,000 candidate parameter vectors drawn
from a 14-dimensional (the number of parameters to be estimated) Sobol sequence. I
rank the vectors by the value of the objective and use the top 1% candidate parameter
vectors to generate a new hypercube on the parameter space. I take the minimum
and maximum parameter value in each dimension to produce the smallest hypercube
surrounding the polytope defined by the convex hull of the highest ranked candidate
parameter vectors. This greatly reduces the overall admissible parameter space without necessarily producing tight bounds on any individual parameter. I iterate on
this procedure 5 times. Sampling points from the hypercube slows the rate at which
regions of the parameter space are discarded, trading off the gain from reducing the
parameter space against eliminating potentially profitable search regions too quickly.
This is similar to the averaging of the best estimate and new draws from a Sobol
sequence in the Tik-Tak algorithm described in Arnoudy et al. (2019). I iterate this
step 5 times. The second stage samples from the new hypercube to generate starting

3

values for the BOBYQA algorithm (Powell, 2009), a trust region based numerical
optimizer. Typically, BOBYQA uses fewer evaluations of the objective function than
other derivative free methods (for example the Nelder-Mead Simplex method Nelder
and Mead, 1965). By combining the BOBYQA method with the multiple starting
points selected above it appears that the parameters obtain the global minimum.
At each stage of the estimation I parallelize both the calculation of the dynamic
programming problem and simulation and the initial candidate parameter vector
using the facilities of the University College London Computer Science High Performance Computing Cluster.
Computing Standard Errors I calculate the Jacobian of the moment conditions
with respect to the parameters by numerical differentiation with a five point stencil
in each dimension (central differencing).
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